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ABSTRACT
In recent years, legal scholars have paid a great deal of attention to
the emergence of constitutional courts and judicial review in
democracies worldwide, yet an intriguing parallel development in
democratic constitutionalism has gone largely unnoticed: the
establishment of independent bodies which, like constitutional courts,
are concerned with foundational commitments of liberal democracy,
but which advance these commitments mainly through investigations
and advice-giving. Lacking de jure authority to block the
implementation of unconstitutional laws and policies, the new advice
givers instead make their contributions ex ante, identifying problems
that warrant legislative attention and helping to craft laws and
regulations that respond to foundational aspirations. This Article
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surveys the emergence of these “advisory counterparts” to
constitutional courts and offers an account of their comparative
advantage, relative to constitutional courts, as guardians of liberality.
The Article also presents an initial treatment of the advisory
counterparts’ characteristic limitations and dangers, and explores
some associated questions of institutional design.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction............................................................................................. 954
I. A Survey of Advisory Counterparts ............................................. 960
A. National Human Rights Institutions ....................................... 961
B. Privacy Commissions ................................................................ 964
C. Information Commissions ........................................................ 966
D. Anticorruption Commissions................................................... 967
E. Electoral Commissions ............................................................. 968
F. Integrative Variants .................................................................. 969
G. Summary..................................................................................... 978
II. Examining the Counterparts: Promise and Pitfalls ..................... 978
A. Crafting Structural Remedies for Illiberality ......................... 982
1. Political Accountability........................................................ 985
2. Political Equality .................................................................. 986
3. Group Animus ...................................................................... 988
4. Liberty and Security............................................................. 990
B. Engaging the Citizenry ............................................................. 993
1. Courts, Counterparts, and the Problem of
Authoritative Prescription ........................................... 994
2. Commanding Attention, Focusing Debate...................... 1008
3. Engaging the Citizenry: Conclusions ............................... 1027
C. The Puzzle of Independence.................................................. 1028
III. Courts and Counterparts Together:
Conflict or Complementarity? ................................................. 1037
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 1042
INTRODUCTION
In the years since World War II, the written, justiciable
constitution has become a universal hallmark of democratic
government.1 As Mark Tushnet quips, “[f]or all practical purposes,

1.

See generally Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Introduction to DEFINING THE FIELD
at xi (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 1999)

OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
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the Westminster model [of legislative supremacy] has been withdrawn
2
from sale.” New and old, democracies everywhere are providing for
some form of constitutional judicial review.
Less widely appreciated is that many democracies are also
establishing independent institutions which, like constitutional courts,
are concerned with foundational commitments of liberal democracy,
but which make their contribution not by adjudicating constitutional
cases but by investigating societal conditions and governmental
conduct, and suggesting policy reforms. Examples include human
rights commissions, electoral commissions, information commissions,
privacy commissions, and anticorruption commissions. Many of these
bodies are purely advisory,3 although some also have specialized
regulatory, administrative, or prosecutorial duties.4 Quite commonly
they possess coercive powers of investigation, such as the subpoena.5
And a few have been given a formal role in the legislative process—
for example, authority to trigger action on their proposals by the
elected branches of government, or even to put questions directly to a
6
referendum vote of the citizenry.
Notwithstanding such variations, all of these bodies may be said
to function, in part, as advisory counterparts to constitutional courts.
Advisory, in that they lack de jure authority to enjoin duly enacted
legislation or regulations. Counterparts, in that they possess the sort
of democracy-reinforcing, rights-safeguarding, and minorityprotecting missions that legal scholars are wont to ascribe to
constitutional courts. To be sure, the symmetry here is inexact. Not all
of the bodies I characterize as advisory counterparts derive their
powers and mission from constitutional texts, nor are they obliged to
anchor their recommendations to the language of a written

[hereinafter DEFINING THE FIELD] (describing the study of comparative constitutional law in
the context of the surge of constitutionalism); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World
Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997) (contrasting American constitutionalism with the
experiences of newer democracies).
2. Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights- and
Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 814 (2003); see also Stephen
Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001)
(describing emerging forms of judicial review in the Westminster democracies).
3. This is typical of human rights commissions. See infra Part I.A.
4. This is true of many election commissions and a few privacy commissions. See infra
Parts I.B, I.E.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.B.2.b.

01__ELMENDORF.DOC

956

3/9/2007 7:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:953

7
constitution. The comparison to constitutional courts is nonetheless
apt in functional terms, however, insofar as one accepts that an
important reason for judicial review is to help secure the basic
commitments of liberal democracy.
Constitutional theorists have paid a great deal of attention to the
global spread of constitutional courts, but they have largely
8
overlooked the emergence of the advisory counterparts. This Article
aims to lift the counterparts’ profile. The new advice-givers, I suggest,
have the potential to make significant contributions to the project of
sustaining and perhaps improving liberal democracy over time—and
to do so in a manner that does not engender the countermajoritarian

7. The new advice-givers have been entrenched in a number of emerging-democracy
constitutions. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROTECTORS OR PRETENDERS? GOVERNMENT
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN AFRICA 28–58 (2001) (tracing the establishment in the 1990s
of constitutionally entrenched human rights commissions in a number of African nations); INT’L
COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, PERFORMANCE AND LEGITIMACY: NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 59–62 (2000), available at http://www.ichrp.org/paper_files/102_p_01.pdf
(discussing the constitutional entrenchment of human rights commissions in new democracies);
RAFAEL LÓPEZ-PINTOR, ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES AS INSTITUTIONS OF
GOVERNANCE 20 (2000) (noting that most independent electoral agencies are constitutionally
entrenched); Birgit Lindsnaes & Lone Linholdt, National Human Rights Institutions: Standardsetting and Achievements, in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: ARTICLES &
WORKING PAPERS, INPUT TO THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 1, 14–15 (Birgit Lindsnaes et
al. eds., 1st rev. ed. 2001) (noting that “[n]ational [human rights] institutions established by
constitution . . . are mainly found in countries which have recently undergone constitutional
reforms and which have been marked by grave human rights violations in the past”).
Roughly analogous bodies have been established by statute in many of the older
democracies. See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra, at 64–67 (discussing the
establishment by statute of human rights commissions in “stable democracies”). Near-to-home
examples include the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (2000); the Election
Assistance Commission, id. § 15381; and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Pub.
L. No. 108-458, § 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684 (2004) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 601).
8. Indicative is the lack of attention to the advice-giving role of independent but
nonjudicial bodies in recent works on constitutional design by Cass Sunstein, CASS SUNSTEIN,
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001), and Bruce Ackerman, Bruce
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 634 (2000), as well as the
absence of these bodies from the foundational casebook, VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999), and compendium of readings on comparative
constitutional law, DEFINING THE FIELD, supra note 1. Ackerman does contemplate a role for
independent but nonjudicial bodies such as electoral commissions and anticorruption
commissions, but he seems to envision these bodies operating in administrative and
enforcement capacities, rather than as sources of law reform. See Ackerman, supra, at 694–96
(proposing an “‘[i]ntegrity [b]ranch’” to investigate corruption); id. at 718–21 (proposing a
“‘democracy branch’” to administer and regulate elections); id. at 723–26 (proposing a
“‘[d]istributive [j]ustice [b]ranch’” to administer a constitutionally entrenched program of
income redistribution).
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worries associated with constitutional judicial review. This Article
gives one account of that potential and takes up some of the
distinctive challenges and concerns that these institutions present.
Along the way I raise many more questions than I answer. The object
of my inquiry is a vast and varied array of institutions, but the
ambitions of this Article are actually rather modest: to explain why
the advisory counterparts should be of interest to constitutional
scholars, and to advance some tentative hypotheses that will help to
orient further inquiry and institutional experimentation.
The attractions of the advisory counterpart model for
institutionalizing a constitutional commitment to liberal democracy
are twofold. First, the counterparts are or could be, in important
respects, better positioned than constitutional courts to pursue
structural remedies for (or prophylactics against) illiberality. This
follows from the counterparts’ license to craft legislative solutions to
the problems they ascertain; from the counterparts’ superior
resources for identifying and understanding threats to liberality; and
from the logical possibility that an independent advisory body could
be more thoroughly insulated from the elected branches of
government without incurring the countermajoritarian risks
associated with constitutional judicial review. To be sure, the
counterparts, as advisory bodies, are always at risk of being ignored,
and an advice-giver that speaks to deaf ears cannot hope to
accomplish much. There is some evidence, however, that elected
officials fear the ballot-box consequences of ignoring counterpart
recommendations on certain kinds of issues (election law and
corruption control) at least at certain times (for example, following
scandals).
The second attraction of the counterpart model is dialogic.
Although counterparts lack the constitutional court’s ability to bring
about public confrontations with constitutional principle by striking
down high-profile laws, some counterparts have other tools with
which to engage mass opinion: the subpoena power, for example, or
authority to set the legislative agenda or trigger a popular
referendum. I shall argue too that certain counterparts may develop
significant persuasive authority with the electorate regarding which
constitutional issues are properly deemed high priorities, even though
average voters are unlikely to follow presumptively the counterpart’s
policy recommendations concerning the problem at hand. By moving
new issues onto the public’s radar screen, counterparts may influence
the course of law reform beyond the election-law and government-
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integrity domains. I shall suggest, moreover, that counterpart prioritysetting and law-proposing is, on plausible normative views, more
attractive than constitutional judicial review as a means of
institutionalizing occasional popular engagement with the meaning
and application of nominally constitutive ideals. The argument turns
on the selection of issues for debate; the costs of the debate-forcing
activity; and the character and consequences of the debate itself.
In addition to offering a sympathetic portrayal of what the
counterparts have to offer, this Article provides a preliminary account
of their characteristic weaknesses and downsides. Beyond the obvious
risk of irrelevance—a risk that is also integral to the counterparts’
appeal—there are two primary concerns. First, the counterparts may
have an institutional interest in discrediting the elected branches of
government. This institutional interest could make some counterparts
less than innocuous, especially if they have coercive investigatory
powers with which to pry into the doings and dealings of top
government officials. Any number of problematic consequences could
follow, ranging from distracted government leaders, to loss of public
support for large-scale public undertakings, to the release of
otherwise latent authoritarian sentiments within the citizenry.
Second, the political forces that help to sustain the de facto
independence of constitutional courts may not operate similarly with
respect to the counterparts. Whatever normative license a
counterpart’s advisory status might provide for thoroughgoing
insulation from the elected branches (at least as to counterparts
whose investigatory powers are tightly circumscribed), independence
in practice may be difficult to achieve.
I will proceed as follows. Part I surveys the worldwide emergence
of nominally independent investigative and advice-giving bodies with
jurisdiction over subjects widely thought foundational to liberal
democracy. The heart of the Article comes in Part II, which compares
constitutional courts and advisory counterparts along three
dimensions: crafting remedies, engaging public opinion, and achieving
independence. Here I develop my account of the counterparts’
attractions, and also flag certain weaknesses and limitations. Part III
briefly examines interactions between courts and counterparts.
A few caveats are in order before moving on. First, in drawing
comparisons between courts and counterparts, I will refer to the U.S.
Supreme Court and associated ideas about and evidence regarding
constitutional judicial review within the American legal tradition.
This obviously will not be the most sensible point of reference for
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many countries that have established or might yet establish advisory
counterparts. But for now it is a useful way to begin, in part because
the U.S. constitutional tradition is the one with which I am most
familiar, and in part because of its influence elsewhere.
Second, the advisory counterparts are as yet little-studied
institutions. Although I will illustrate my arguments with suggestive
anecdotes, this paper is best viewed as an exercise in informed
conjecture. Insofar it succeeds, the payoff will take the form of a
clearer understanding of questions worth investigating via empirical
studies of the extant counterparts, and, relatedly, a better feel for the
problems and possibilities with which proponents and designers of
these bodies ought to be concerned.
Third, in fleshing out my argument with examples, I am not
going to dig into the historical experiences and political cultures of
different polities. Such matters undoubtedly have much to do with the
successes and failures of particular advisory bodies, but they lie
beyond the scope of this paper.
Fourth, although this paper is concerned with the functioning of
different kinds of institutions in service of the “basic” ideals of liberal
societies, I wish to bracket philosophical disputes about what,
precisely, the concept of liberal democracy entails. I take it as given
that the following characteristics are foundational, recognizing that
there will often be philosophical disagreements about the liberal
merits or demerits of specific policies:
Accountability. Liberal states require their legislators to stand
occasionally for popular election, under conditions conducive to
holding incumbents accountable for their achievements and failures
while in office.
Political equality. Liberal societies enable their adult citizens to
participate in the political process on equal footing. Excluding from
the sphere of politics the inequalities that prevail in economic and
9
social spheres is a necessary aspiration. A perfect separation of these
spheres will never be achieved, of course, and any attempted
separation should be evaluated with an eye to costs as well as
benefits, particularly insofar as those costs come in the coin of other

9. Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 3–6 (1993) (developing an account of liberal democracy centered on the
maintenance of distinct “spheres” of activity, each with its own regulative norms).
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10
liberal-democratic aspirations, such as accountability. But a liberal
polity will nonetheless attend to the goal of political equality, and not
sacrifice it lightly—and never for illiberal reasons.
Tolerance. Liberal states do not pass or implement laws for the
purpose of beating up on ethnic or religious minorities, or other outgroups. They provide space for individuals to live out their lives by
the lights of their own basic values, even if those values are quirky.
Civil liberty. Liberal democracies do not treat civil liberty with
nonchalance. In detaining and punishing putative wrongdoers, liberal
states make concerted efforts to identify their targets correctly.
Liberal societies confronted with tradeoffs between liberty and
security may well conclude that there is no essential core of civil
liberties or associated procedural protections that must at all times be
respected, but the liberal state will nonetheless value liberty, and will
not be arbitrary or rash in deciding when or how to curtail it.

I. A SURVEY OF ADVISORY COUNTERPARTS
Constitutional democracies have spawned numerous public
advisory bodies whose missions pertain to basic liberal aspirations,
but there is as yet no comprehensive, transnational survey of these
institutions. The partial account provided here focuses on permanent
and nominally independent governmental bodies whose advice-giving
work concerns political accountability or equality, public integrity,
personal autonomy, civil liberty, or the treatment of minority
groups.11 It has been pieced together from the smattering of writings
and Internet resources about national human rights institutions,
electoral commissions, privacy commissions, anticorruption
commissions, and information commissions.12 The existing scholarship
10. For an example of the (potential) clash between political equality and accountability,
consider the question of whether individuals and organizations should be allowed to make large
monetary donations to political campaigns. An unlimited right to donate favors the rich; at the
same time, it may also help opponents of the government mount effective campaigns. Cf.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002] prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those entities most
capable of giving such criticism loud voice. . . .”).
11. Omitted from my survey are temporary, ad hoc bodies created in response to the
exigencies of the day, as well as permanent bodies, such as science advisory boards, whose work
is not closely connected to basic liberal-democratic aspirations.
12. Notably absent from this list are criminal sentencing commissions. It turns out that
permanent advice-giving commissions with jurisdiction over criminal punishment have rarely
been created outside of the United States, Michael Tonry, Parochialism in U.S. Sentencing
Policy, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 48, 59–61 (1999), although government leaders in many countries
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on these bodies is quite insular. Each subject seems to have its
enthusiasts, and there is little cross-talk. The present survey, though
undoubtedly incomplete, does tend to suggest that the establishment
of an ongoing, independent body tasked with conducting research and
investigations and giving advice is a recurring strategy for addressing
threats to liberal-democratic values, and it also raises the question of
what might be learned from studying these bodies in relation to one
another.
A. National Human Rights Institutions
National human rights institutions (NHRIs)—governmental
entities with a mandate to promote and protect human rights—are
rapidly becoming commonplace around the world. One survey
concluded that in 1990 there were only eight such bodies worldwide;
13
by 2002, there were fifty-two. These bodies have emerged in all sorts
of countries, from well-established democracies to the rudest of
dictatorships, and they vary hugely in their structure, powers, and
subject matter jurisdiction.14 Some cover human rights generally;
others have narrower mandates concerned with, for example, prison
conditions,15 illicit discrimination,16 or the status of women.17
NHRIs emerged from two distinct traditions, the ombudsman
and the commission of inquiry,18 and their activities differ

have convened ad hoc advisory bodies for criminal law reform, Andrew J. Ashworth, Sentencing
Reform Structures, 16 CRIME & JUST. 181, 202–09 (1992).
13. MORTEN KJAERUM, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: IMPLEMENTING
HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (2003).
14. For a voluminous survey of extant NHRIs, see HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS AND
OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: NATIONAL EXPERIENCES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Kamal Hossain
et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter NATIONAL EXPERIENCES].
15. In South Africa, for example, the Human Rights Commission initially did a
considerable amount of work on prison conditions, but this responsibility has since been spun
off to a statutory oversight body, the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 7, at 298–99; see also JUDICIAL INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, ANNUAL REPORT 1999
§ 1, available at http://judicialinsp.pwv.gov.za/Annualreports/annual2000.asp (explaining the
context in which the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons was established).
16. See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that some
countries that lack national human rights commissions have national anti-discrimination
commissions).
17. South Africa’s constitution, for example, establishes a Commission on Gender
Equality, in addition to a Human Rights Commission. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
7, at 296; Commission on Gender Equality, http://www.cge.org.za (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
18. See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 92.
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19
accordingly. A Swedish invention, the classical ombudsman is
supposed to function as “the people’s “representative” in the
executive branch of government.20 The paradigmatic ombudsman’s
office is headed by a single person, appointed by parliament, whose
charge is to impartially investigate individuals’ claims of
administrative unfairness and to help the affected persons secure
21
relief. Commissions of inquiry, by contrast, are usually multimember bodies set up to study large-scale societal problems and to
propose policy reforms.22 European NHRIs tend to operate like
23
They
make
policy
ongoing
commissions
of
inquiry.
recommendations to the legislature and executive agencies but most
do not handle individual complaints.24 Outside of Europe, NHRIs
typically respond to individual complaints in addition to launching
investigations on their own initiative,25 and many are authorized to
compel testimony and the production of documents.26 Whatever the

19. See Leonard F.M. Besselink, Types of National Institutions for the Protection of Human
Rights: An Overview of Legal and Institutional Issues, in NATIONAL EXPERIENCES, supra note
14, at 157, 160 (“[T]he perceived function of ombudsman institutions is usually to exert powers
of investigation and scrutiny of administrative and other acts and omissions of the executive.
Human rights commissions, however, usually have as one of their primary tasks to give advisory
opinions to the legislature.”).
20. LINDA C. REIF, THE OMBUDSMAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 12 (2004); cf. Besselink, supra note 19, at 161 (regarding ombudsman
accountability to parliament).
21. U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 8–9
(1995).
22. Regarding the history of commissions of inquiry, particularly those in Great Britain,
see generally CHARLES J. HANSER, GUIDE TO DECISION: THE ROYAL COMMISSION (1965), and
THE ROLE OF COMMISSIONS IN POLICY-MAKING (Richard A. Chapman ed., 1973).
23. Morten Kjaerum, The Experiences of European National Human Rights Institutions, in
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: ARTICLES & WORKING PAPERS, supra note 7, at
113, 114–19.
24. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 25; Kjaerum, supra note 23, at 114–19.
25. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 25.
26. I have not been able to locate data on the percentage of NHRIs with coercive powers
of investigation, but proponents of NHRIs clearly contemplate the exercise of such powers. See,
e.g., U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 32 (describing appropriate powers of
investigation); C. Raj Kumar, National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance
Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human Rights, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 259, 274–75
(2003) (lauding delegation to the National Human Rights Commission of India of the “powers
of a civil court”). NHRIs with coercive powers of investigation are found, for example, in El
Salvador, Barbara von Tigerstrom, Implementing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The
Role of National Human Rights Institutions, in GIVING MEANING TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS 139, 146–47 (Isfahan Merali & Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2001); India,
Kumar, supra, at 274–75; Uganda, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 357–58; and South
Africa, id. at 294–95. The influential “Paris Principles,” described infra in the text accompanying
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scope of their powers of investigation, however, the formal remedial
27
power of most NHRIs is limited to giving advice. Some may also
litigate claims on behalf of victims,28 or refer questions directly to the
29
constitutional court, but very rare is the NHRI that may issue legally
binding remedial orders.30
Proponents of NHRIs have worked through the United Nations
31
to establish benchmarks for the design of these institutions. Issued in
1991 by a U.N. workshop, the “Paris Principles” prescribe that
NHRIs shall be representative of “the [plurality of] social forces (of
civilian society) involved in the protection and promotion of human
rights”; functionally independent from the executive branch of
government; and authorized to “submit to the Government,
Parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis . . .
opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters
concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.”32 The
Principles also urge NHRIs to take on a public education role, with
notes 31–33, instruct that NHRIs “shall [be authorized to h]ear any person and obtain any
information and any documents necessary for assessing situations falling within its competence.”
Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions, G.A. Res. 48/134, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Paris Principles], available at http://www.ohchr.org/
english/law/parisprinciples.htm.
27. Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights
Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 28
(2000) (“[M]ost national human rights institutions cannot make binding decisions and are
confined to giving non-binding recommendations, advice and reports, plus sometimes being able
to refer matters to tribunals for a legally binding decision.”); Carolyn Evans, Human Rights
Commissions and Religious Conflict in the Asia-Pacific Region, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 713, 719
(2004) (“[T]he ability to make binding decisions is not a feature of [National Human Rights
Commissions] in the Asia-Pacific region . . . .”); Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 26
(noting that a majority of NHRIs “can recommend settlements of disputes or make decisions on
complaints that are, however, not legally binding on the involved parties or the government”).
28. This power is typical of the Defensor del Pueblo, an office established under a number
of Latin American constitutions. See REIF, supra note 20, at 191.
29. Such referral powers are possessed by a number of the “human rights ombudsman”
established by the post-Soviet constitutions of Eastern Europe. Reif, supra note 27, at 40–41
(Poland); id. at 43 (Slovenia). Human Rights Commissions in Australia, India, and Canada have
also been authorized to intervene in court proceedings. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at
28–29.
30. Exceptions include the Ugandan Human Rights Commission, which by the terms of the
constitution may “order the release of a detained person, payment of compensation or any
other legal remedy or redress,” id. at 28, and the Ghana Commission for Human Rights and
Administrative Justice and the Tanzanian Commission for Human Rights and Good
Governance, which may obtain judicial orders enforcing certain of their recommendations,
REIF, supra note 20, at 19.
31. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 10.
32. Paris Principles, supra note 26.
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the aim of inculcating human rights norms, spreading awareness of
violations, and encouraging the ratification of and compliance with
33
“international human rights instruments.”
Within the United States, the nearest thing to an NHRI on the
model of the Paris Principles is the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
an investigatory and advisory body that dates back to the Eisenhower
years.34 Although encouraging the ratification and implementation of
international human rights conventions is assuredly beyond its
mandate, the Commission on Civil Rights is concerned with matters
fundamental to human dignity: It is charged with investigating sworn
complaints of deprivations on the basis of color, race, religion, sex,
35
age, disability, or national origin; and, more generally, with
advancing equal-protection goals by “study[ing] and collect[ing]
information,” “mak[ing] appraisals of the laws and policies of the
Federal Government,” “serv[ing] as a national [information]
clearinghouse,” and “prepar[ing] public service announcements and
advertising campaigns to discourage” illicit discrimination.36
B. Privacy Commissions
Specialized bodies concerned with data privacy have been
created in every European Union member state and at least a dozen
other countries.37 These bodies help to implement and revise data
38
protection laws. Some have licensing and related regulatory powers;

33. Id.
34. An in-depth history of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to the present day has yet
to be written. For an introductory look at the body and its work, see Jocelyn C. Frye et al., Note,
The Rise and Fall of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
449 (1987). The early history of the Commission is told in FOSTER RHEA DULLES, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS COMMISSION: 1957–1965 (1968).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(a)(1) (2000).
36. Id. § 1975a(a)(2).
37. Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the United States:
Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183, 1185 (2003). A
European Union data privacy directive requires that each member state establish an
independent authority for “monitoring the application within its territory of the provisions
adopted by the Member States pursuant to [the directive].” Council Directive 95/46, art. 28,
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). European data protection institutions are surveyed briefly in Herbert
Burkert, Institutions of Data Protection: An Attempt at a Functional Explanation of European
National Data Protection Laws, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 167, 176–80 (1981), and in much greater
depth in HERBERT BURKERT, THE ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE OF DATA PROTECTION
AGENCIES, EEC JOINT STUDY ON DATA SECURITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY (1980).
38. Regarding information-privacy institutions that combine advisory and regulatory
functions, see Burkert, supra note 37, at 180–88.
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39
others operate in a purely advisory capacity. Canada and Germany
40
pioneered the advisory model. There, at both the state and the
national level, “data privacy commissioners” with some degree of
independence from the government, badger ministries to do a better
job of privacy protection.41
Within the United States, California recently established an
42
advisory Office of Privacy Protection, and in late 2004, Congress, at
the behest of the 9/11 Commission, chartered the Privacy and Civil
43
Liberties Oversight Board. The Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board has data privacy responsibilities,44 but its potential
reach is much broader than that. Congress found that “the “potential
shift of power and authority to the Federal Government” [attendant
to the “war on terrorism”] “calls for an enhanced system of checks
and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way
of life.”45 The scope of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board’s advisory jurisdiction is correspondingly large.46 There are,
however, serious questions about whether the Board will prove
meaningfully independent of the White House and capable of
investigating intransigent bureaucracies.47

39.

For case studies of the two models, see DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY
(1989).
40. See id. at 21–90 (West Germany); id. at 243–301 (Canada).
41. Id. at 21–22, 243.
42. Gellman, supra note 37, at 1189.
43. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684 (2004).
44. Id. § 1061(c)(2), 118 Stat. at 3685.
45. Id. § 1061(a), 118 Stat. at 3684.
46. “The Board shall ensure that concerns with respect to privacy and civil liberties are
appropriately considered in the implementation of laws, regulations, and executive branch
policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.” Id. § 1061(c)(3), 118 Stat. at
3685.
47. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, Bipartisan Civil Liberties Board Fix Bill Long
Overdue, Measure Would Take Oversight Panel Out of the “Hip Pocket of the President”
(Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17570prs20050315.html
(supporting proposed legislation that would make the Civil Liberties Oversight Board
independent and bipartisan and give it more oversight power); Richard B. Schmitt, Privacy
Guardian Is Still a Paper Tiger, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at A1 (“Foot-dragging, debate over
its budget and powers, and concern over the qualifications of some of its members—one was
treasurer of [President] Bush’s first campaign for Texas governor—has kept the board from
doing a single day of work [for more than a year since its authorizing legislation was enacted].”).
The proposed Protection of Civil Liberties Act, H.R. 1310, 109th Cong. (2005), would enhance
the Board’s subpoena powers and condition presidential appointments to the Board on the
Senate’s advice and consent. See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY AND
IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES
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C. Information Commissions
Much as privacy commissions have been established to guide the
implementation and revision of data-protection laws, “information
commissions” have been chartered to monitor the legal and
administrative framework concerning governmental transparency.48 In
some nations, information commissioners serve as specialist
ombudsmen, helping individuals to navigate the administrative
labyrinth created by freedom of information acts.49 In others, such as
Ireland and the United Kingdom, the commissioners can issue
binding orders of disclosure—subject, however, to ministerial
override.50
Whatever
their
administrative
or
regulatory
responsibilities, information commissioners are typically charged with
“general oversight of the [freedom of information] system [including]
reviewing and proposing changes, training, and public awareness.”51
52
Most information commissioners have authority to act sua sponte.
Within the United States, state-level information commissions
53
have been established in New York and Connecticut. New York’s
plays a largely advisory role, whereas Connecticut’s also investigates
and adjudicates claims brought under the state’s open-government
statute.54

CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD: 109TH CONGRESS PROPOSED REFINEMENTS 6 (2005),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22078.pdf.
48. One recent survey found that more than a dozen nations had established information
commissions with some degree of independence from the government. DAVID BANISAR, THE
FREEDOMINFO.ORG GLOBAL SURVEY: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND ACCESS TO
GOVERNMENT RECORD LAWS AROUND THE WORLD 6 (2004), available at http://www.
freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2004.pdf (noting that such bodies exist in Belgium,
Canada, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Mexico, Portugal, Slovenia, Thailand, the
United Kingdom, and on the regional level in Canada and Germany).
49. Id.
50. Id. For a helpful overview of the enforcement role of information commissioners in
Europe, see HERKE KRANENBORG & WIM VOERMANS, ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EC AND MEMBER STATE LEGISLATION
22–23 (2005).
51. BANISAR, supra note 48, at 6.
52. KRANENBORG & VOERMANS, supra note 50, at 23–24.
53. See Robert G. Vaughn, Administrative Alternatives and the Federal Freedom of
Information Act, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 192–209 (1984) (describing and comparing New York
and Connecticut commissions).
54. Id. at 193.
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D. Anticorruption Commissions
Following the lead of Singapore and Hong Kong in the early
55
1970s, a number of countries have created specialized agencies to
control corruption.56 These bodies investigate criminal wrongdoing,
design and encourage the adoption of reforms to reduce
opportunities and incentives for corruption, and seek to challenge
public complacency about the extent, permissibility, or inevitability of
corruption.57 Variations on the Singapore/Hong Kong model have
cropped up in Botswana, Macau, New Zealand, Nigeria, the
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Zambia, and several states in
Australia.58 As with NHRIs, there is a transnational good-government
movement spurring the establishment of anticorruption commissions
59
and defining associated “best practices.”
Not all of the new anticorruption commissions are based on the
60
Singapore/Hong Kong template. In the United Kingdom, for
example, a Committee on Standards in Public Life was created by
61
Prime Minister John Major in 1994. Essentially a permanent
commission of inquiry, this body has no criminal investigation
responsibilities, but it has played a significant role in crafting
anticorruption legislation and related political process reforms.62

55. Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”) became active in 1970;
Hong Kong set up its Independent Commission Against Corruption (“ICAC”) in 1974. See
Michael Johnston, A Brief History of Anti-Corruption Agencies, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING
STATE 217, 219–21 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999).
56. See generally id.
57. MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN 36–52 (2004) (describing the activities of
the Hong Kong ICAC); Johnston, supra note 55, at 218–19 (noting that the typical
anticorruption commission does both enforcement and corruption-prevention work).
58. Johnston, supra note 55, at 219.
59. The leader here has been Transparency International. See, e.g., JEREMY POPE, TI
SOURCE BOOK 2000, at 95–104, available at http://legacy.transparency.org/sourcebook.
60. Michael Johnston observes that “there is no single ‘ICAC strategy,’” in that the extant
independent anticorruption commissions differ widely in their jurisdiction, their powers, and
their relative emphasis on policy reforms, education, or the investigation and prosecution of
individual cases of wrongdoing. Michael Johnston, Independent Anti-Corruption Commissions:
Success Stories and Cautionary Tales, in CORRUPTION, INTEGRITY, AND LAW-ENFORCEMENT
253, 254–55 (Cyrille Fijnaut & Leo Huberts eds., 2002).
61. Committee on Standards in Public Life, http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/about_us/
index.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
62. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1392–93 & nn.117–21 (2005).
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E. Electoral Commissions
In most democracies, a nominally independent agency runs or
63
regulates elections. Some electoral commissions double as advicegivers, and a few are principally or exclusively concerned with
research and advice-giving.
South Africa’s Electoral Commission illustrates the hybrid
model. In addition to administering elections, this body has a
mandate to “conduct research on electoral matters and to
continuously review electoral legislation” in the interest of
“strengthening . . . constitutional democracy.”64 Likewise, Spain’s
Junta Electoral Central, a regulatory agency, is authorized to “submit
proposals for modifications to bills that are being discussed in
Parliament.”65 The Australian Election Commission and Elections
Canada, both election administrators, also have public education
roles and a responsibility to report to parliament on the operation of
the electoral laws following each general election.66 Uruguay’s Courte
Electoral holds hearings on election law bills introduced in
67
parliament. And at various times the election administration
agencies of Botswana, Pakistan, and Russia have had a hand in the
68
development of reform legislation.
The purely advisory variant on the independent electoral
commission is exemplified by well-established districting commissions
in the United Kingdom, Canada (at the provincial level), Germany,
69
and Iowa. These bodies periodically propose new constituency maps
to the legislature, but they lack de jure power to revise district maps
70
unilaterally. Another example is the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission, created in 2002, whose mission is to study “election

63. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 7, at 25–26. Most of these bodies are constitutionally
entrenched. Id. at 20.
64. Id. at 40. The Electoral Commission’s power of review is only advisory. See Electoral
Commission Act 51 of 1996 s. 5(j).
65. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 7, at 177.
66. See Colin A. Hughes, The Independence of the Commissions: The Legislative
Framework and the Bureaucratic Reality, in REALIZING DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL LAW IN
AUSTRALIA 205, 209–10 (Graeme Orr et al. eds., 2003); Jean Pierre Kingsley, The
Administration of Canada’s Independent, Non-Partisan Approach, 3 ELECTION L.J. 406, 406–07
(2004).
67. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 7, at 157.
68. Id. at 172–73, 199, 204–06, 217–19.
69. Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1386–90 & nn.76–101.
70. Id.
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administration issues”
Congress.72

969

and make associated recommendations to

F. Integrative Variants
The degree of specialization among the advisory counterparts is
curious. Although some nations make use of specialist electoral
courts,73 I know of no constitutional democracy that has partitioned
responsibility for enforcing the justiciable provisions of its basic
document among privacy courts, human rights courts, gender equality
courts, separation of powers courts, and so forth. Such specialization
appears to be quite common among the advisory counterparts. I have
not been able to identify any ongoing, independent advisory body
whose jurisdiction is spelled out in terms meant to capture the full
sweep of the society’s constitutive commitments or aspirations. There
are, however, several real-world precursors for such an integrative
advisory counterpart.
For starters, a handful of the new investigative/advisory bodies
have missions encompassing more than one of the issue areas this
Article has examined. The mandate of Ghana’s Commission on
Human Rights and Administrative Justice conjoins the protection of
74
“fundamental rights and freedoms” with the fight against corruption.
Tanzania has assigned responsibility for advancing human rights and
“good governance” principles” to a Commission for Human Rights
and Good Governance.75 Nations that give human rights or
anticorruption responsibilities to an ombudsman often stipulate that
the person who holds this office should also carry out the traditional
ombuds-duty of ensuring “legality and fairness” in government
administration.”76 Uganda’s Inspectorate of Government, for
example, has corruption detection and prevention functions, but is

71. 42 U.S.C. § 15381(a) (Supp. III 2003).
72. Id. § 15381(c). In important respects, however, the EAC’s design is seriously flawed.
See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1441–44.
73. Responsibility for adjudicating disputes over electoral outcomes is often lodged with
the same independent body that administers elections. See, e.g., Fabrice E. Lahoucq, Can the
Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization, 23 INT’L POL. SCI. REV.
29, 36–37 (2002) (describing electoral tribunals in Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica).
74. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 154.
75. Leonard G. Magawa, Tanzania’s Commission for Human Rights and Good
Governance: A Critique of the Legislation, INT’L OMBUDSMAN Y.B., Vol. 6, 2002, at 100, 101.
76. Reif, supra note 27, at 11–13 (describing emergence of “hybrid human rights
ombudsman” institutions).
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also tasked with “promoting fair, efficient, and good governance in
public offices,” and “stimulating public awareness about the values of
77
constitutionalism.”
The concept of human rights may itself be so labile as to enable a
commission charged with their promotion and protection to take up
the privacy, the electoral, or even the freedom-of-information
concerns that many nations have assigned to specialist advisory
bodies. Thus, South Africa’s Human Rights Commission has been a
forceful proponent of transparency measures, drawing a linkage
between freedom of information and human rights protection.78
Another potential antecedent for the integrative advisory
counterpart is the law revision commission. For hundreds of years it
has been commonplace for governments to convene temporary
commissions of legal notables to identify anomalies and ambiguities
79
in the law and to develop clarifying, simplifying reforms. Starting
mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, a number of countries—and a handful
of states within the U.S.—established permanent commissions to
carry out this legal housekeeping function.80 At first, these permanent

77. REIF, supra note 20, at 232–33. See generally Edmond R.B. Nkalubo, Uganda Human
Rights Commission Including the Office of the Inspectorate of Government, in NATIONAL
EXPERIENCES, supra note 14, at 579, 579–92 (describing the history and current powers of the
Uganda Human Rights Commission and the Inspectorate of Government).
78. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 300; see also S. AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMM’N, THE GUIDE ON HOW TO USE THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT ACT 2 OF 2000, at 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc_cms/downloads/
PAIA%20GUIDE%20english.pdf (addressing linkages between information and human
rights).
79. See generally Michael Kirby, Are We There Yet?, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM
433 (Brian Opeskin & David Weisbrot eds., 2005) (noting historical examples of consultation as
well as the more recent development of substantial commissions); Hon. J. Bruce Robertson,
Law Reform: What Is Our Knitting? How Do We Stick to It?, Address to the Association of
Law Reform Agencies in East and Southern Africa Conference 1–5 (Mar. 15–17, 2005),
available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/SpeechPaper/7571ca2d-1bff-4af3-96da21174f89f6fd//ALREASA%20speech%20170205.pdf (describing the development, functions,
operations, and goals of law reform commissions).
80. Prominent adopters include England and Scotland (Law Commission Act, 1965), see
Robertson, supra note 79, at 2 & n.7; South Africa (South African Law Commission Act, 1973),
id. at 4; Australia (1975; now governed by the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996),
id.; Ireland (Law Reform Commission Act 1975); New Zealand (1985), id. at 5; and Canada
(which created a permanent law commission in 1970, terminated it in 1992, and set up a new one
in 1997), id. at 3–4 & nn.15–16. Countries with law revision commissions today include:
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Canada, Cyprus, England & Wales, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Hong Kong,
India, Ireland, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Northern
Ireland, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Scotland, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, and
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law commissions bore little resemblance to the bodies I have labeled
“advisory counterparts.” Their mission was interstitial, their agenda
81
was typically subject to governmental control, and they were
populated with lawyer-technocrats who served at the will of elected
82
officials.
Many of the permanent law commissions have struggled to
83
define their niche and justify their continued existence. Their
difficulties have been variously attributed to loss of public confidence
84
in technocratic modes of policymaking; to the emergence of new
institutions for policy research and law reform within the legislative
Zimbabwe. Austl. Law Reform Comm’n, Overseas Law Reform Sources, http://www.alrc.gov.
au/links/overseaslawreform.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). U.S. states with permanent law
revision commissions include: California, Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, History and Purpose,
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/background.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007), Connecticut, Conn. Law
Revision Comm’n, http://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc (last visited Jan. 17, 2007), Michigan, Mich. Law
Revision Comm’n, http://www.council.legislature.mi.gov/mlrc.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2007),
New Jersey, N.J. Law Revision Comm’n, http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us, (last visited Jan. 17,
2007), Oregon, Or. Law Comm’n, http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/oregonlawcommission (last
visited Jan. 17, 2007), and Utah, Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions
Things of the Past? The Increasing Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional
Change, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 1, 14–15 (1996).
81. See Peter Hennessy, Independence and Accountability of Law Reform Agencies, in THE
PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 72, 80 (“The work program of most law reform
agencies in [Commonwealth countries] is determined by the government.”).
82. Cf. Michael Tilbury, A History of Law Reform in Australia, in THE PROMISE OF LAW
REFORM, supra note 79, at 3, 12–13 (discussing the focus of early reform commissions on
“‘lawyers’ law’”—mere technical niceties—and their eschewing of the “embedded policy
issues”). Permanent law reform commissions whose organic acts exemplify the classical model
are found in Australia (Australian Law Reform Commission Act, 1996), Ireland (Law Reform
Commission Act, 1975), and the United Kingdom (Law Commission Act, 1965), among other
places. (Notwithstanding the formal structure of the body, the first chairperson of the
Australian Law Reform Commission publicly rejected the “‘lawyer’s law’” model of law reform
and sought to develop, instead, a more policy-oriented and public-involving modus operandi.
Tilbury, supra, at 13–15.)
83. See Roderick Macdonald, Continuity, Discontinuity, Stasis and Innovation, in THE
PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 87, 90 (“After a brief flourishing, many law reform
agencies in Canada, Australia and other Commonwealth countries were disbanded, fiscally
starved, or otherwise neglected during the 1990s.”). Canada’s Law Commission, which some
observers consider exemplary, was disbanded in 1992, revived in 1997, and, as part of a
Conservative assault on public institutions thought to have a liberal bias, abruptly defunded in
2006. See John Ibbitson, Fatal Cuts to Law Panel Deeply Ideological, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 28,
2006, at A4; Bert Archer, Laying Down the Law, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 30, 2006, at F2.
84. David Weisbrot sees the permanent law commissions as part and parcel of a
“modernist” project, marked by faith in expertise, technocratic problem-solving, and biglaw/big-government solutions to social problems. David Weisbrot, The Future for Institutional
Law Reform, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 18, 19–20. To prosper in the
present day, they must shift from technocratic to consultative and public-involving modes of
decisionmaking. Id. at 29–35.
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85
86
and executive branches of government; to anti-intellectualism; and,
87
in the case of some commissions, to ideological anachronism. Yet as
one commentator wryly remarks, “law reform commissions, like
88
vampires, appear to be difficult to kill.” Some that were eliminated
89
have been reconstituted anew, and the concept of a permanent law
revision agency continues to draw adherents: today there are, by one
count, more than sixty general-purpose law reform commissions
worldwide.90
As law commissions and their proponents seek contemporary
foundations for the commissions’ continued existence, they
increasingly invoke the ideal of a law-revision body “independent”
from everyday politics and therefore (so it is said) capable of offering
a uniquely long-term, multi-disciplinary, and public-involving
91
perspective on societal problems. Some general purpose law
commissions are beginning to assert their independence from the
92
elected branches of government, and to have that independence

85. See, e.g., Macdonald, supra note 83, at 96 (“[T]here was no question that by the early
1990s the [soon-to-be-abolished] Law Reform Commission of Canada was not doing anything
substantively different from the Department of Justice.”); David Solomon, Relations with the
Media, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 175, 175 (“Law reform agencies are
normally engaged by governments in particular tasks because the work is dry, technical and
publicly unexciting. If the prospective reform is likely to excite public passion, it is far more
likely to be handed over to a parliamentary committee to explore.”); Weisbrot, supra note 84, at
20–21 (describing the emergence within Australia and her constituent states of joint ministerial
councils, well-staffed and resourced parliamentary committees, specialist advisory bodies under
the purview of the Attorney General, and more).
86. Macdonald, supra note 83, at 91 (suggesting that the critique of judges’ and law
commissioners’ ability “to distil ‘neutral principles’” provided “convenient cover for the antiprofessionalism, anti-scientism and anti-intellectualism of many latter-day political
movements”).
87. Michael Tilbury suggests that some Australian law commissions, being “product[s] of a
political era of welfare liberalism,” failed to adapt to the “neo-liberal era.” Tilbury, supra note
82, at 15.
88. Weisbrot, supra note 84, at 24.
89. Id.
90. Elton Singini, Foreword to THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at v, v.
91. Hennessy, supra note 81, at 78–80 (characterizing benefits of independence in law
reform work); Kate Warner, Institutional Architecture, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM,
supra note 79, at 55, 67 (“Ministerial and parliamentary committees cannot offer . . .
independent advice based on the different experiences, approaches and outlooks that are
available to an independent body.”); Weisbrot, supra note 84, at 27 (“It is fundamental to
success that a law reform commission maintain its independence.”).
92. See, e.g., Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The Law Reform Enterprise in New Zealand,
Address to the Board of the New Zealand Law Society 2 (Feb. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/SpeechPaper.aspx (stating that the New Zealand Law Commission
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93
recognized. Some have been authorized to undertake law reform
projects sua sponte, without prior government approval.94 And most
intriguingly, a few law commissions now describe their mission in
ways that echo the representation-reinforcing and fundamentalrights-protecting work of constitutional courts. Thus, in a recent
speech, the President of the New Zealand Law Commission indicated
that his body would focus on issues as to which the ordinary political
process is prone to failure.95 The Malawi Law Commission, which is

“has the same sort of independence as Judges in formulating its recommendations”); Robertson,
supra note 79, at 12 (“In my judgment a Law Commission must never be constrained in its
ability to approach a problem as it sees fit, to assess an issue and all its ramifications and have
the ability to recommend and report without inhibition or constraint.”). Law Comm’n of Can.,
Operations Protocol (on file with author) (“The Commission will develop its research
programme around general themes that reflect problems as experienced, regardless of how
these problems are cast in federal legislation. . . . The Commission seeks to maintain a balance
between its policy independence from the Department of Justice, and its accountability to the
Canadian public through the tabling of its Reports in the Parliament of Canada.”).
93. See, e.g., DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, THE LAW COMMISSION AND
GOVERNMENT: WORKING TOGETHER TO DELIVER THE BENEFITS OF CLEAR, SIMPLE,
MODERN LAW para. 1.9 (2006), http://www.dca.gov.uk/pubs/reports/lawcomm_vision.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2007) (“The Government is committed to respecting the independence of the Law
Commission as a statutory body.”); Austl. Law Reform Comm’n, About the ALRC,
http://www.alrc.gov.au/about (last visited Jan. 5, 2007) (“[T]he ALRC is not under the control of
government, giving it the intellectual independence and ability to make research findings and
recommendations without fear or favour.”); Letter from Gov. Theodore R. Kulongoski to the
Program Committee of the Oregon Law Commission (Nov. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/oregonlawcommission/home/EthicsGovernorsProposal.pdf
(explaining Governor’s decision, following veto of government ethics bill, to refer to Oregon
Law Commission the issue of “comprehensive” reform to public ethics law—and noting that the
Commission, being a “unique non-partisan partnership,” was “particularly well-suited to this
task”).
This is not to say that governments have consistently recognized and heeded the
independence of those law commissions that lay claim to independence. In Canada, for
example, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper completely defunded the Law
Commission, a move that cheered his base but was attacked in other quarters as illegitimate and
possibly illegal. Compare Tony Gosgnach, Conservatives Slash Secret Liberal Excesses, 15
CATHOLIC INSIGHT 34 (2007), and Frances Russell, Harper Re-Engaging Far Right, WINNIPEG
FREE PRESS, Oct. 11, 2006, at A13 with Lindsey Wiebe, Cutting Law Commission Funds May
Be Illegal, Layton Says, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Oct. 6, 2006, at A5. See also Kirk Makin,
Ontario Unveils Law Reform Commission, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 1, 2006, at A6 (reporting on
efforts to establish a provincial law reform commission “impervious to future political
meddling” in the wake of the defunding of the Law Commission of Canada).
94. This is the case in, for example, Canada and New Zealand. See Law Commission Act of
Canada, S.C., ch. 9, § 4 (1996); Law Commission Act 1985, 1985 S.N.Z. No. 151.
95. See Palmer, supra note 92, at 4–5 (stating that the commission’s “comparative
advantage” is to be found in “large, long-term projects that straddle electoral cycles”; projects
that “[i]nvolve issues that span the interests of a number of government agencies and
professional groups”; projects that “[n]eed to be done independently of central government
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constitutionally entrenched, undertakes to “review all laws of Malawi
for conformity with the Constitution and applicable international
96
law.” The Law Commission of Canada claimed a mandate “to
examine critically even the most fundamental principles of the
Canadian legal system and to evaluate the performance of those
institutions by which these principles are put into practice.”97 The
Commission endeavored “to point out explicitly where the law is
lacking in relevance and responsiveness, where it is inaccessible and
where its principles or impacts are unjust.”98 This is a far cry from
99
code-book housecleaning.
Following public consultations, the Law Commission of Canada
chose to work on such foundational and politically fraught projects as
“Order and Security,” “Electoral Reform,” and “From Restorative
100
Justice to Transformative Justice.” The Commission proposed farreaching changes, including the replacement of first-past-the-post

agencies because of the existence of vested interests”; and projects that “[r]equire independent
consideration in order to promote informed public debate on future policy direction”). A
similar theme recurs in the project selection criteria of the Law Reform Institute of Alberta,
which include whether the “project [is one] that neither the political process nor the
administrative process is likely to deal with effectively.” J. Bruce Robertson, Initiation and
Selection of Projects, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 102, 106.
96. Mwangala Kamuwanga, The Challenge of Law Reform in Southern Africa, in THE
PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 422, 428.
97. Law Comm’n of Can., Mandate (on file with author).
98. Id.
99. Whether the Law Commission of Canada should be viewed as a harbinger of law
commissions to come is an open question. On the one hand, the Commission was considered a
model by leading figures in the law reform community worldwide. See Archer, supra note 83.
But its ambitious agenda had an ideological sting, and led to conflicts with the Conservative
government of Stephen Harper, which completely defunded the Commission shortly before this
Article went to press. See supra note 83. Whether the Commission’s defunding was a death knell
remains to be seen. Some observers attacked the defunding as illegitimate or even illegal. See
Ibbitson, supra note 83; Lindsey Wiebe, Cutting Law Commission Funds May Be Illegal, Layton
Says, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Oct. 6, 2006, at A5. Some pointed out that the Conservatives
resorted to financial “chicanery” to hobble the Commission because they “kn[ew] they would
lose” if they asked Parliament to repeal the act that created the Commission. See Ibbitson,
supra. In Ontario, the provincial government responded to the Law Commission of Canada’s
defunding with a proposal to establish a provincial law reform commission “impervious to
political meddling.” Kirk Makin, Ontario Unveils Law Reform Commission, GLOBE & MAIL,
Dec. 1, 2006, at A6. In short, while the Commission is presently defunct, it is entirely possible
that the next government will provide it with new funding and perhaps introduce legislation to
shore up its independence. For the Commission to prosper over the long run, however, it will
probably be necessary for it to develop new decisionmaking criteria and procedures to combat
the perception that it is a tool of left-liberal activists.
100. Law Comm’n of Can., Research Projects, (on file with author).
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elections (for seats in Parliament) with a mixed-member proportional
101
alternative.
Increasingly, law commissions are also being established to
develop constitutional amendments and revisions. This has occurred
102
at the state level in the United States, and at the national level in
103
other polities. Constitution revision commissions are almost always
ephemeral, disbanding upon the issuance of their recommendations,
and in that sense unlike the other bodies surveyed here.104 But their
use is broadly consistent with the trend toward employing law reform
commissions for much more than housekeeping.
A final institutional antecedent for advisory counterparts whose
subject-matter jurisdiction would extend to the full sweep of the
polity’s basic aspirations is the vestigial second legislative chamber,
such as the U.K.’s House of Lords. Historically, it was quite common
for bicameral democracies to provide for the selection of upper-house
members by appointment, heredity, or indirect election by political
105
elites. These selection procedures were designed so as to represent
either the propertied classes or, in confederated nations, the
constituent units of government.106 Second chambers organized on the
propertied-classes model foundered in the late nineteenth and
107
twentieth centuries. Increasingly out of step with democratizing
cultures, some of these bodies were abolished, and many more were
108
subjected to broad-based popular elections. Others saw their
109
powers drastically curtailed. For example, the Parliament Act of
1911 replaced the House of Lords’ power to block legislation with a
101. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., VOTING COUNTS: ELECTORAL REFORM FOR CANADA 90
(2004).
102. See Williams, supra note 80, at 1–2 (“[T]he research leading to this article grew out of
work performed for a state constitutional commission. Such appointed commissions and their
growing impact on the evolution of state constitutions have not been adequately recognized.”).
103. See, e.g., Brij V. Lal, Constitutional Engineering in Post-Coup Fiji, in THE
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY 267, 268 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002); Bereket Habte
Selassie, The Eritrean Experience in Constitution Making: The Dialectic of Process and
Substance, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, supra, at 357, 358–59; The Constitution of
Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), http://www.kenyaelections.com/kenyareview.html (last
visited Jan. 21, 2007).
104. One exception is Utah’s Constitution Revision Study Commission, which has been in
operation since 1969. See Williams, supra note 80, at 14–15.
105. See generally GEORGE TSEBELIS & JEANNETTE MONEY, BICAMERALISM 15–43 (1997).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 34–35.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 34.
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“suspensive veto,” subject to override by the House of Commons
110
following a modest interval of time. Populist pressures have not
abated. Reformers continue to agitate for abolition or direct election
111
of the “undemocratic” upper houses, making members of these
bodies reluctant to exercise even the modest power of the suspensive
veto.112
It is possible, however, that if the process of appointing upper
house members is reformed so as to strip away any remnants of
propertied privilege and to ensure that the appointees are not just
partisan hacks, the appointed second legislative chambers will come
to play distinctive and useful roles as constitutional advice-givers,
perhaps with a limited power of legislative delay.113 This is the future
for the British upper house envisioned by the Royal Commission on
the Reform of the House of Lords (also called the Wakeham
Commission), which Prime Minister Blair convened in the late
1990s.114 The Wakeham Commission made several intriguing
suggestions. It urged that the House of Lords institutionalize its
constitutional safeguarding role by setting up “an authoritative
Constitutional Committee . . . of distinguished people who . . . are
under a duty to produce independent, dispassionate, and
authoritative reports on problem areas within the constitution and on

110. Id.
111. For case studies illustrating the tenuous position of the upper house in a number of
advanced democracies, see generally SENATES: BICAMERALISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD (Samuel C. Patterson & Anthony Mughan eds., 1999) [hereinafter SENATES]. In their
concluding chapter, Patterson and Mughan observe that a “general lack of democratic
legitimacy” often leaves upper houses “in a weak position to defend themselves against political
opponents demanding their reform.” Anthony Mughan & Samuel C. Patterson, Senates: A
Comparative Perspective, in SENATES, supra, at 333, 340.
112. That a lack of democratic credentials has long made the House of Lords reluctant to
exercise the suspensive veto is a recurring theme in British scholarship and commentary. See,
e.g., Denis Carter, The Powers and Conventions of the House of Lords, 74 POL. Q. 319 (2003)
(describing this thesis).
113. Note that the idea that upper houses have an important role to play in countering the
momentary “passions” of the citizenry is one with a long and illustrious lineage. See Samuel C.
Patterson & Anthony Mughan, Senates and the Theory of Bicameralism, in SENATES, supra note
111, at 1, 13–15. Consistent with the idea that second chambers have a special constitutional
safeguarding role, many have greater de jure authority to block or delay constitutional reforms
than ordinary legislation. See MEG RUSSELL, REFORMING THE HOUSE OF LORDS 40 & tbl. 2.2
(2002).
114. Blair’s initial agenda for House of Lords reform—including appointment of a Royal
Commission to make recommendations—was set forth in MODERNISING PARLIAMENT:
REFORMING THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1999, Cm. 4183, available at http://www.archive.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/cm41/4183/4183.htm.

01__ELMENDORF.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:44 AM

ADVISORY COUNTERPARTS

977

115
proposals for changing it,” and by establishing a parallel or subcommittee “with a wide-ranging remit in relation to human rights.”116
The Commission further argued that a mostly appointed House of
Lords could play this constitutional safeguarding role better than an
elected House, not simply because of the appointed body’s greater
remove from partisan and electoral politicking, but also because an
appointed body could in some respects be more representative of the
citizenry as a whole than a directly elected body.117 The strains of
modern-day campaigning have winnowed the pool of potential
elected officials, the argument went, and a suitably appointed body
could be comprised of persons with a much wider range of
experiences and outlooks.118
Issued in 2000, the Wakeham Commission’s report was not
wholeheartedly embraced by the Blair government, which chafed
against the body’s recommendation for separating the upper house
from political party control.119 Yet there has been incremental
movement in the direction of some of the report’s central
120
recommendations, and as the House of Lords becomes more
broadly representative of the British populace, it is starting to behave
more assertively.121

115. ROYAL COMM’N ON THE REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, A HOUSE FOR THE
FUTURE 53 (2000).
116. Id. at 56.
117. Id. at 96–103 (setting forth “characteristics” that would be desirable to have in the
membership of a reformed House of Lords); id. at 106 (“A wholly directly elected second
chamber could not be broadly representative of the complex strands of British society.”).
118. Id. at 106, 115.
119. See PAT STRICKLAND & OONAGH GAY, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, RESEARCH
PAPER 02/002, HOUSE OF LORDS REFORM—THE 2001 WHITE PAPER 10–16 (2002),
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2002/rp02-002.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2007)
(comparing Wakeham proposal and the official Government response).
120. Blair unilaterally established an appointments commission modeled on the Royal
Commission’s proposal, and promised not to interfere with the Commission’s choice of
“independent” peers. See OONAGH GAY & RICHARD KELLY, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY,
STANDARD NOTE SN/PC/2855, THE HOUSE OF LORDS APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION 2–5
(2006), http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-02855.pdf (last visited Jan. 5,
2007). Blair has also promoted legislation that would provide a statutory foundation for the
Appointment Commission’s role. Id. at 10–12.
121. See RUSSELL, supra note 113, at 315 (suggesting that a long-quiescent House of Lords
is showing new signs of life following recent changes which (i) eliminated the hereditary peers
and (ii) brought the partisan balance of the House of Lords into alignment with the party
preferences of the British electorate).
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G. Summary
Any generalization about the gamut of institutions I have
surveyed would be hazardous. But in the interest of concreteness, this
Article will use the term advisory counterpart to refer to a publicly
chartered body with the following attributes. First, as to subject
matter: the body is concerned with one or more areas of law touching
on the characteristic commitments of liberal democracy, such as the
protection of minority groups, the maintenance of separate public and
private spheres, the holding of fair elections, and the like.122 Second,
powers: the body has some coercive powers of investigation, and
authorization to act sua sponte. It is charged with developing law
reform recommendations and conducting educational campaigns but,
absent a revocable delegation of authority from the legislature, it may
not promulgate rules with the force of law. Third, independence: the
advisory counterpart is constitutionally entrenched or otherwise
designed for some degree of independence from the elected branches.
The advisory counterparts are kin to constitutional courts by dint
of the foundational nature of the topics with which they are
concerned and their putative independence from the other branches
of government. In other respects, however, the advisory counterparts
look much more like administrative agencies. But they are agencies of
a peculiar breed, set up to challenge the elected branches rather than
to do their bidding, encouraged not simply to implement statutes but
to press for their reform.123
II. EXAMINING THE COUNTERPARTS: PROMISE AND PITFALLS
This Part develops a comparison of constitutional courts and
advisory counterparts along three dimensions: crafting remedies,
engaging public opinion, and achieving independence from the
122. The body might invoke the text of a written constitution in justifying its proposals, but
this is not strictly necessary. It might also flesh out its charge with reference to norms found in
statutory law, cultural traditions, international conventions and treaties, and the moral intuitions
of the body’s members.
123. Others have recognized that administrative agencies can play an important advisory
role in law reform. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (envisioning roles for a hypothetical risk-regulation
super-agency); Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715 (2005) (exploring
factors that make sentencing commissions successful). On Breyer’s and Barkow’s accounts,
agencies wield influence by gradually building the trust of elected officials. I will argue, by
contrast, that under the right conditions, advisory counterparts can wield influence by
challenging elected officials, rather than by serving as the officials’ dutiful agent.
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elected branches of government. My goal is to depict how the
advisory counterparts, seen in a favorable light, could contribute to
the project of liberal, democratic self-government, and also to identify
some of the practical impediments to realizing this vision. The bestlight argument explains my excitement about these bodies and will, I
hope, motivate other legal scholars to venture forth into this largely
uncharted institutional terrain. The practical-problems arguments are
designed to orient subsequent empirical research and institutional
tinkering.
The best-light argument for what the counterparts have to offer
runs on two levels. The first level concerns the establishment of
structural remedies for—or prophylactics against—illiberal political
dynamics. I focus more particularly on problems of top-down
illiberality, wherein elected officials either take advantage of citizen
inattention to pursue illiberal policies or actively try to shape illdefined or plastic citizen preferences so as to create a base of support
for the officials’ illiberal ambitions.
With respect to the establishment of remedies for (and
safeguards against) illiberal political dynamics, the counterparts have,
or could have, four important advantages over constitutional courts.
For one, the fact or the prospect of such illiberal dynamics is often
best addressed through legal reforms that are “legislative” in
character, in that they involve setting up and funding public
regulatory or oversight bureaucracies (e.g., freedom of information
laws), or complex adjustments to the design of electoral systems.
Familiar concerns about the separation of powers discourage judicial
efforts to craft such legislative remedies. By contrast, developing
legislation is right up the counterparts’ alley.
The counterparts are also better positioned than constitutional
courts to figure out when and why liberal values are threatened, and
how those threats might best be countered. Many counterparts wield
coercive powers of investigation, and even counterparts that lack de
jure authority to force top officials to testify or hand over documents
are better positioned than appellate courts to assemble information
on governmental conduct and societal conditions. The counterparts
have the administrative resources and flexibility to commission
studies, to consult with current and former political insiders, to hold
public hearings, and otherwise to gather and filter information about
government practices.
A third counterpart advantage is that advisory bodies can, in
principle, be designed for greater independence from the elected
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branches of government than constitutional courts, without posing
much threat to democratic self rule—for however great its
independence from the elected branches, a purely advisory body is
unlikely to derail a governmental initiative without mustering a base
of popular support for its position. This potential for greater
independence is of no small significance insofar as the central purpose
for the body in question is to guard basic constitutional ideals against
illiberal ploys by then-serving elected officials.
Finally, the counterparts are, in certain respects, better
positioned than constitutional courts to develop what I shall term
persuasive authority with average citizens, such that citizens revise
their own policy preferences (if any) in line with the independent
body’s recommendation. I concede that counterpart persuasive
authority is likely to be weak in absolute terms, even inconsequential,
as to many issues much of the time. But there is some basis for
thinking—and some evidence—that counterparts can exercise
significant persuasive authority on election-law and governmentintegrity questions, particularly in the wake of scandals. Enough, in
fact, to get elected officials to accede to reforms they personally
disfavor.
Put these pieces together—the wherewithal to design legislative
solutions to structural illiberality, great independence from the
elected branches of government, and persuasive authority with the
citizenry (at least as to certain issues, at certain times)—and the
picture that emerges is of an institution that could effect reforms that
are wholly beyond the ken of constitutional courts, and do so in a
manner that does not do violence to democratic sensibilities.
The second level of the best-light argument is concerned not with
the counterparts’ achievement of particular legal reforms but rather
with the nature of the public dialogue and debate that the
counterparts may bring about. My foil is the thesis that the principal
function of, and justification for, constitutional judicial review as
practiced in the United States is to induce the public to confront—
and in the process to refine or even remake—constitutional principle.
Judicial review is a potentially powerful tool for catching public
attention, and an independent body whose powers are merely
advisory would seem much less well positioned to direct attention to
the issues it deems important. But some counterparts wield other
public powers that may be employed for debate-forcing purposes.
Examples include the subpoena power, and, much less commonly,
“legislative process rights,” such as authority to trigger a vote of the
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legislature or a referendum on counterpart-proposed reforms.
Moreover, a suitably designed counterpart may be able to establish
persuasive authority with the electorate regarding public priorities,
even if the body wields little persuasive authority (outside the
election law and government integrity contexts) regarding what,
exactly, should be done about the “priority” problem it has identified.
As a thought experiment, I propose a model under which a
counterpart with jurisdiction over the full sweep of the polity’s basic
commitments is authorized to make “determinations of exceptional
need,” which determination (1) would operate as a condition
precedent for the counterpart’s exercise of its legislative process right,
and (2) would formally preclude the counterpart from exercising this
right again for at least x years. By credibly signaling the counterpart’s
big-picture judgment about constitutional priorities and by calling
into a play a process that will result in a vote on whether to adopt the
counterpart’s proposed reform, the determination of need may be
expected to move the counterpart’s findings and recommendations to
the center of public debate.
I conclude the dialogic argument with a brief, schematic account
of how institutions set up for the purpose of instigating public
dialogue about the meaning and application of a polity’s nominally
constitutive commitments might be compared and assessed. In terms
of these normative criteria, it is at least plausible to think that voteforcing by a priority-setting counterpart would prove more attractive
than judicial review by constitutional courts. This argument is frankly
speculative, in both its positive and normative dimensions. The point
of the exercise is not to say that the United States or any other
constitutional democracy should jettison constitutional courts in favor
of priority-setting counterparts with legislative process rights, but
simply to illustrate how one might go about comparing alternative
ways of institutionalizing constitutional dialogue, and to draw out
what is plausibly distinctive about the counterparts.
Taken together, the best-light arguments offer a vision of what
advisory counterparts might realistically achieve. They do not purport
to explain the successes and failures of counterparts extant in the
world today. If the best-case scenario were uninspiring, there would
be little point in trying to figure out how real-world counterparts
measure up and why they sometimes fall short.
There are, of course, practical problems, the most basic of which
is relevance. The recommendations of many existing counterparts
seem to have little political traction. These entities wield little if any
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persuasive authority with the proverbial median voter, and they lack
appropriate tools for forcing problems to the center of public debate.
Advisory counterparts may also have an institutional interest in
discrediting the elected branches of government, which could lead to
overuse of their investigatory powers (if any), with worrisome
consequences: distracted government decisionmakers, loss of public
support for large-scale governmental initiatives, or even bottom-up
illiberality.
Third, whatever the normative appeal of providing counterparts
with great independence from the elected branches, this may be quite
a challenge to achieve in practice. Some of the forces supporting
constitutional courts’ de facto independence from the elected
branches are nonoperative as to the counterparts. And some of the
institutional design strategies that might support the counterparts’ de
facto independence would also make them rather more dangerous
entities, which undercuts the normative argument for great
independence in the first instance.
*

*

*

My presentation of the best-light and practical problems
arguments is organized around the focal topics of remedies, public
engagement, and independence. As to each, I seek to adduce both the
relevant theoretical considerations and some real world illustrations.
A. Crafting Structural Remedies for Illiberality
It is no secret that constitutional courts are uncomfortably
positioned to give effect to liberal commitments where doing so
requires not the elimination of a problematic statute, regulation, or
administrative practice, but rather supplementation of the offending
item (e.g., adding a new section to a statute), or initiation of some
new governmental undertaking. To be sure, constitutional courts do
have tools for establishing affirmative reforms. The structural
injunction is one possibility.124 As well, the nominally negative power
125
of striking down statutes may be used to affirmative ends. (If the
124. For a classic treatment of U.S. practice, see generally OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
125. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
EUROPE 61–91 (2000) (explaining how, in several European democracies, judge-made norms
come to be encoded in statutes as legislatures respond to court decisions); J. MITCHELL
PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL
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stricken law was popular and the court’s opinion instructs the
legislature on some other, constitutionally permissible way of
achieving the same or similar ends, a favorable legislative response
will often ensue.) Some constitutional courts are authorized to issue
126
advisory opinions in which they make policy suggestions, and others
127
not so authorized may use dicta to much the same effect.
Yet judicial forays into the crafting of affirmative remedies for
constitutional problems are often—and properly—of quite narrow
reach. It is not necessary for present purposes to get mired in the
debate about what distinguishes an appropriate judge-made remedy
from inappropriate “judicial legislation.” Suffice it to say that there is
considerable agreement that constitutional courts generally should
not get into the business of crafting large regulatory programs, adding
new provisions to statutes, setting budgetary priorities, and the like.
These limitations are grounded in concerns about the likelihood of
error (resulting from judges’ lack of policymaking and policymonitoring expertise and the limitations of their case-specific point of
view), as well as normative ideas about democratic legitimacy and the
separation of powers.128

REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004) (examining congressional response to judicial
decisions).
126. Regarding the use of advisory opinions by state supreme courts within the United
States, see Jonathan D. Persky, Note, “Ghosts that Slay”: A Contemporary Look at State
Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155 (2005). Abroad, there is at least one judicial system,
New Zealand’s, in which bill-of-rights adjudication is only advisory. See generally ANDREW
BUTLER & PETRA BUTLER, THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (2005);
THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS (Paul Rishworth et al. eds., 2003).
127. Compare Neal K. Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998)
(explaining how advicegiving in dicta can be a valuable alternative to aggressive forms of
judicial review), with Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to
Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998) (debating the propriety of Article III
courts’ use of dicta for policy advicegiving).
128. For notable articulations of and variations upon these themes within the U.S. legal
tradition, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 136–
204 (2001) (discussing the problem of “strategic judgment” in constitutional adjudication and
associated limits on reach of the courts); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 640–47
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (setting forth legal theses of the legal
process school concerning problems “appropriate for adjudication”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at
221–37 (exploring possibilities for judicial enforcement of positive social welfare rights,
consistent with familiar understandings of limits on the judicial role). For an important partial
dissent from the prevailing view, see Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (arguing that
constitutional courts can and should pursue large-scale institutional reform remedies, at least in
circumstances where the legislature or other actors have created or can be induced to create
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The judiciary’s limited capacity to fix constitutional problems is
implicitly acknowledged in many of the post-Civil War, rightscreating amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which authorize
129
Congress to enforce the article “by appropriate legislation.”
Constitution framers in other countries have recognized limits to
judicial implementation of constitutional commitments by designating
130
certain sections of the constitution as nonjusticiable.
Reliance on legislative implementation may be a sensible
response to worries about judicial capacity for crafting effective
remedies, or to anxieties about judicial overreach, but what is to be
done when members of the elected branches have a political incentive
not to enact “appropriate legislation”? If the incentive results from
the clamoring of an inveterately illiberal populace, perhaps nothing
can be done. But to the extent that the incentive is an artifact of the
ways in which public institutions channel and inform political
competition, and if actors external to the elected branches are
positioned to revise the problematic structures of representation or
otherwise to effect liberal reforms, there may be some basis for hope.
This is, of course, the root hope of process-based theories of
131
constitutional judicial review. But courts can only do so much,
thanks to their limited remedial capacities. Independent advisory
bodies that combine the constitutional court’s characteristic remove
from everyday politics with the legislature’s capacity for designing
monitoring and standard-setting institutions on which the courts can rely). Illuminating
perspectives from commentators within other traditions are found in COURTS AND POLICY:
CHECKING THE BALANCE (B.D. Gray & R.B. McClintock eds., 1995) (surveying the status,
across several Commonwealth nations, of the “balance in constitutional functions between the
legislature/executive and the courts”), JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991) (providing case studies of eleven countries), and Dieter Grimm,
Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy, in JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 103 (Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2000) (offering a German justice’s
perspective on maintaining balance between legislative and judicial authority).
129. These include the Thirteenth Amendment, which bans slavery and involuntary
servitude; the Fourteenth Amendment, which establishes the national and State citizenship of
all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and which subjects the states to due process
and equal protection obligations; and the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twentysixth Amendments, which guarantee that the right to vote shall not be abridged on account of
race, sex, failure to pay a tax, or age (in the case of citizens who are 18 or older), respectively.
130. Often these sections establish positive rights. For an illuminating discussion of the nonjusticiable “directive principles” found in the constitutions of South Africa and Ireland, see
Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895,
1898–1902 (2004).
131. The classic statement is in JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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reforms to public institutions and electoral structures have the
potential to do much more. The balance of this Section makes this
point concrete—and shows what’s at stake—by highlighting several
scenarios in which (1) political dynamics threaten to undermine
liberal aspirations such as public accountability, political equality,
tolerance, and civil liberty, even absent a powerful and incorrigibly
illiberal faction within the citizenry; and (2) “appropriate” reforms lie
beyond reach of the courts. In the Section that follows, I take up the
question of how advisory counterparts can build public support for
their proposed reforms.
1. Political Accountability. That elected officials must face the
voters every so often gives those officials an interest in adjusting the
rules of political competition in ways that disfavor challengers.132 To
be sure, a vigilant citizenry that closely monitors the doings of
political insiders can retard this tendency. Voters who agree on the
limits of legitimate behavior by elected officials, and who understand
what those officials are doing, might be able to coordinate on a
“throw the bums out” strategy.133 But politicians whose careers are on
the line will typically have much more information than do voters
about how political competition is likely to be affected by, for
example, particular reforms to information-disclosure regimes,
campaign-finance laws, ballot-access rules, or electoral district
boundaries.134 Self-interested incumbents may take advantage of
asymmetric information to erode political competition.
It bears emphasis that political accountability depends not only
on familiar negative freedoms, such as rights to criticize the
government and form advocacy groups, but also on the various
statutes and administrative apparatuses that make the rights to

132. Cf. Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, Regulating Democracy Through
Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 997
(2005) (“Perhaps more than any other political phenomenon, incumbents’ capture of political
institutions through the manipulation of the rules of the electoral game has commanded the
attention of scholars of the law of democracy in recent years.”).
133. But see JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY:
AMERICANS’ BELIEFS IN HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 36–60 (2001) (developing the
idea of “process space”—a dimension of voter decisionmaking concerned with political process
as such—and theorizing that two-party competition fails to generate convergence on the median
voter’s position in process space, as such competition has long been thought to do in policy
space).
134. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 709 (1998).
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criticize and associate meaningful sources of accountability. These
statutes often implicate exceedingly delicate questions about
institutional design. Consider the cross-cutting issues at stake in what
might be termed the “transparency regime”—the set of rules,
administrative protocols, and enforcement mechanisms that provide
citizens with information about what their government is up to, about
who has contributed what to the campaigns of elected leaders, and
about the financial entanglements of government officials. The
crafting of transparency policy requires close attention to incentives
and opportunities for obfuscation, to the packaging and timing of
information disclosures, and to such countervailing values as privacy,
intragovernmental deliberation, and security.135 Courts may be able to
tinker productively at the margins of a statutorily created
transparency regime,136 but no one seriously argues that constitutional
courts should dictate the basic contours of the regime,
notwithstanding that government leaders often will wish to conceal
far more information than is justifiable in public-interest terms.137
2. Political Equality. The regulative ideal of political equality
presents any number of difficult questions about collective obligation.
Should the government undertake to register all eligible voters, as
opposed to putting the onus on citizens to self-register?138 Should
private campaign finance be augmented through voucher or
matching-fund programs that would enable citizens of modest means

135. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 918–23 (2006) (discussing the
tradeoffs and policy problems presented by open government laws); Mark Fenster, The Opacity
of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006) (same). Cf. Pablo da Silveira, Representation,
Secrecy, and Accountability, 12 J. INFO. ETHICS 8 (2003) (linking information disclosure policies
to theories of representation).
136. Samaha, supra note 135, at 956–76.
137. Much the same can be said about the role of courts vis-à-vis the technological and legal
architecture requisite to the production, through digital speech, of what Jack Balkin terms
“democratic culture.” See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 52–54 (2004) (arguing
that, in the digital age, free speech advocates ought to shift their attention from “speech rights”
to “speech values,” and claiming that it will fall to legislatures and administrative agencies
rather than courts to protect these values, due to courts’ inability to craft suitably
comprehensive and technologically informed regulatory arrangements).
138. Cf. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 964–73 (2005)
(calling for universal voter registration).
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139
Does a
to be heard when politicians compete for dollars?
commitment to political equality entail a commitment to high quality
and publicly financed education?
However these questions are answered, two things are clear.
First, judicial imposition of such affirmative remedies for political
inequality would tax the technical competence and quite possibly the
legitimacy of constitutional courts. Second, the elected officials and
political parties who hold the reins of power will assess possible
reforms to the laws that regulate political participation in terms of the
likely electoral payoff. They will weigh the probable electoral fallout
from denying political equality claims against the likely change in the
composition and orientation of the electorate that would result from
recognizing those claims. Consequently, electoral competition can
generate sharp expansions or curtailments of political equality.140
The early efforts of the United Kingdom’s recently established
Electoral Commission illustrate how an independent advisory body
can articulate a vision of political equality and encourage the passage
of legislation responsive to that vision. With the aim of securing “the
widest possible participation in democracy,”141 the Commission has
proposed reforms that would facilitate voting by the blind and by
142
non-English speakers; called for public matching funds for small
political donations (up to £200);143 and encouraged experimentation

139. Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS (2002) (proposing
voucher program); John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 591, 640–66 (2005) (proposing matching fund program); Spencer Overton, The Donor
Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73 (2004) (same).
140. The curtailment dynamic is sadly illustrated by the history of the African-American
franchise following Reconstruction. For a succinct history see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy,
Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000).
141. ELECTORAL COMM’N, STANDING FOR ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 8 (2003),
available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/Standing_9846-7972__E__N__S__
W__.pdf; see also ELECTORAL COMM’N, VOTING FOR CHANGE: AN ELECTORAL LAW
MODERNISATION PROGRAMME 13 (2003) [hereinafter ELECTORAL COMM’N, VOTING FOR
CHANGE], available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/Votingforchange_
16305-7978__E__N__S__W__.pdf (proposing more than one hundred “electoral law
modernization” reforms, with the aim of “creat[ing] the best possible conditions for the widest
possible range of political parties and candidates to engage with the electorate”).
142. ELECTORAL COMM’N, EQUAL ACCESS TO DEMOCRACY 4 (2003), available at
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/Access_9786-7962__E__N__S__W__.pdf
(recommending that Braille and large-print paper ballots be made available, and that nonEnglish speakers be aided with foreign language instructions and pictorial guides).
143. ELECTORAL COMM’N, THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES 4–5, 97–101 (2004),
available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/partyfundingFINALproofs_1530111394__E__N__S__W__.pdf.
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with new voting technologies that could lower the cost (to voters) of
144
casting a ballot. At the same time—and much to the chagrin of the
Labour government—the Commission has forcefully advocated
switching from a household to an individualized system of voter
registration.145 The Commission has defended its registration-reform
proposals not only on grounds of preventing fraud and coercion, but
also on the “point of principle” that “the nature of voting itself is a
fundamental individual right.”146 Because “[e]lectoral registration is
the basis for voter participation,” the Commission explained, “it too
147
should be based on the individual.”
3. Group Animus. The holding of elections can affect, in
predictable ways, the degree of tolerance or intolerance that prevails
among the ethnic and religious groups that make up a citizenry.
Donald Horowitz and others have shown that under the right
conditions—basically, where the electoral system is structured such
that politicians have to develop cross-group support in order to get
elected—the effects can be very salutary.148 But where the electoral
system aligns with preexisting social cleavages, enabling politicians to
win office with the support of a single group, the effects can be
devastating. Here, the fact that office-holders must periodically stand
for election can result in a terrific incentive for politicians to foment

144. ELECTORAL COMM’N, SECURING THE VOTE 37–40 (2005), available at http://image.
guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2005/05/20/eleccommission.pdf (assessing prospects
for “multi-channel” elections); ELECTORAL COMM’N, VOTING FOR CHANGE, supra note 141, at
34–35 (embracing voting technology pilot programs).
145. ELECTORAL COMM’N, DELIVERING DEMOCRACY? THE FUTURE OF POSTAL VOTING
7 (2004), available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/DeliveringDemocracy
finalcomplete_16306-10935__E__N__S__W__.pdf (describing individual electoral registration as
“the key building block on which safe and secure remote elections can be delivered);
ELECTORAL COMM’N, SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 144, at 41–42. On the Labour
Government’s chagrin, see Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1396–1404 (describing tensions
between Electoral Commission and Blair Government).
146. ELECTORAL COMM’N, COMMISSION’S RESPONSE TO DCA PAPER ON ELECTORAL
ADMINISTRATION 6 (2005), available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/
ECresponsetoDCApolicypaper_17721-13100__E__N__S__W__.pdf.
147. Id.
148. See generally DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 601–52 (2d ed.
2000); BEN REILLY, DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: ELECTORAL ENGINEERING FOR
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (2001). Quantitative, cross-national results on the impact of electoral
systems on cleavage politics—in particular, the choice of “bonding” or “bridging” strategies by
political parties and the extent to which group membership determines voting behavior—are
provided in PIPPA NORRIS, ELECTORAL ENGINEERING: VOTING RULES AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR 97–124 (2004).
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149
intergroup hatred, particularly insofar as out-group members have
exit options, and can be harassed into leaving the jurisdiction.150 The
important point for present purposes is that illiberal racial or religious
sentiments are not just a given—a fact of life that politicians must
deal with. They can be exacerbated or assuaged through political
campaigns and public programs, and whether the dominant
politicians happen to be flamethrowers or reconcilers is not just a
matter of chance, but of the interplay between electoral and social
structures.
Horowitz indicates that ethnically and religiously fractured
societies often fare best under democratic rule when legislators are
elected from multimember districts using “alternative vote”
balloting.151 The alternative-vote rule rewards candidates who manage
to become the second choice of voters, which encourages cross152
cleavage electioneering. Districted elections can be advantageous
too, in that they reward legislators who pursue low-conflict political
strategies like constituent service and provisioning of pork, rather
than more ideological programs.153

149. HOROWITZ, supra note 148, at 349–60; see also Rogers Brubaker & David D. Laitlin,
Ethnic and Nationalist Violence, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 423, 433–34 (1998) (reviewing empirical
literature on group leaders’ “deliberate staging, instigation, provocation, dramatization, or
intensification of violent or potentially violent confrontations with outsiders” which is
“ordinarily undertaken by vulnerable incumbents seeking to deflect within-group challenges to
their position by redefining the fundamental lines of conflict as inter- rather than (as challengers
would have it) intragroup”); cf. Tom Ginsburg, Democracy, Markets and Doomsaying: Is Ethnic
Conflict Inevitable?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 310, 330 (2004) (“Ethnic tension is generally a
top-down phenomenon, not one that emerges from the grassroots.”).
150. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping
the Electorate, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2005).
151. Donald L. Horowitz, Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers, 14 J.
DEMOCRACY 115, 122–25 (2003); Donald L. Horowitz, The Alternative Vote and Interethnic
Moderation: A Reply to Fraenkel and Grofman, 121 PUB. CHOICE 507 (2004) [hereinafter
Horowitz, Alternative Vote and Interethnic Moderation].
152. Horowitz, Alternative Vote and Interethnic Moderation, supra note 151, at 508.
153. NORRIS, supra note 148, at 11–13, 230–46. There is, of course, no one-size-fits-all
“electoral solution” to the problem of ethnic conflict, and many other structural features of
government (beyond the choice of a vote-aggregation rule) can affect the incentives for
conciliation, or otherwise help to avert ethnic conflict. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic
Conflict Management for Policymakers, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC
SOCIETIES 115 (Joseph. V. Montville ed., 1990) (discussing federalism, devolution, vote
distribution requirements, the reservation of positions for members of specific groups, and
more); Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Pluralism: Strategies for Conflict Management, in FACING
ETHNIC CONFLICTS: TOWARD A NEW REALISM 203 (Andreas Wimmer et al. eds., 2004)
(cautioning against generalizing about ethnic conflicts).
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Needless to say, it would be a radical move for a constitutional
court to demand an end to at-large elections with proportional
representation in favor of geographic constituencies, or to order the
replacement of single-member district, first-past-the-post elections
with a “specially designed for tolerance” multi-member district,
alternative-vote setup.154 But as the Law Commission of Canada has
demonstrated, some advisory counterparts are capable of pursuing
155
wholesale reforms to the structure of representation.
4. Liberty and Security.
The question of what sorts of
institutional arrangements best encourage prudent policymaking in
the face of suddenly elevated security risks is very much open.156 I
take it that a good arrangement would accommodate liberty
infringements that yield genuine and roughly commensurate security
benefits, while hindering the use of security measures for purely
political gain (e.g., rally-round-the-flag effects, the harassment of
political opponents, etc.). Whatever the particulars, it is certainly
plausible to think that most such arrangements would subject the
executive to oversight by a body (1) that is not controlled by persons
who have an interest in the political success of the head of the
government, and (2) that is positioned to evaluate the extent of
liberty-infringement and the achievement of security benefits under
the program in question. Constitutional courts might contribute at the
margins to this process by, for example, policing the separation of
powers as between the government and oversight bodies.157 But it

154. Note in this regard that while the Voting Rights Act has provided the U.S. Supreme
Court with an open-ended statutory platform for redesigning representational structures with an
eye to better integrating minority groups into the political process (so that Justices who wish to
pursue this agenda need not resort to the big gun of a constitutional holding), the Court has
been exceedingly reluctant to entertain structural remedies beyond (1) the substitution of
districted for at-large elections; and (2) the redesign of single-member districts so as to ensure
that geographically concentrated minorities are able to elect responsive representatives under
conditions of polarized voting. Cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881 (1994) (rejecting votedilution challenge to structure of county government for want of a “principled . . . benchmark of
comparison”).
155. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
156. For a useful compendium of views see THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND
ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2005).
157. See infra Part III. Constitutional courts might also have an important role to play in
categorically defending certain core liberties during tumultuous times, but their track record in
this respect is checkered at best. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 162 (1999) (“We can look around the world for examples of
[judicial] resistance [to extreme cases of oppression], and we will not find enough to take heart
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strains credulity to think that courts could do a good job of seeing to
the establishment of such bodies, let alone of assessing for themselves
the achievements and limitations of different security initiatives.
Constitutional judicial review is no substitute for sound framework
legislation that limits or expands executive discretion in relevant
respects; that imposes appropriate reporting and auditing
requirements; that partitions responsibilities among electorally
accountable and electorally insulated institutions, and majority and
minority parties; and that sunsets or otherwise provides for its own
158
periodic review and re-assessment.
India’s National Human Rights Commission illustrates how a
persistent advisory body may afford a line of defense against the
unwarranted curtailment of civil liberties. The Commission has
contributed to the development of better interrogation practices, and
has been a forceful critic of anti-terrorism legislation. Regarding the
former, the Commission’s investigations into mistreatment and death
of detainees led it to conclude that post-mortem examinations of
159
persons who die in custody should be videotaped. Twenty Indian
160
states have since adopted this policy.
The Commission also
convened a group of forensic experts to develop better postmortem
161
These
procedures, and produced a Model Autopsy Form.
interventions may not resolve the problem of detainee abuse, but

from.”); George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts
During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1984) (reviewing the history of court
involvement in the regulation of emergency situations arising in common law countries); K.D.
Ewing, The Futility of the Human Rights Act, 48 PUB. L. 829 (2004) (critically surveying the
contemporary and historical record of British judges in addressing liberty, privacy, and freedomof-association concerns in the face of national security threats). But see GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 550 (2004) (“[T]he [U.S. Supreme] Court has a
long, if uneven, record of fulfilling its constitutional responsibility to protect civil liberties—even
in time of war.”).
158. For illustrative framework-legislation proposals, see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004) (proposing framework legislation to check executive
powers during a state of emergency); John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, If Terrorists
Attacked Our Presidential Elections, 3 ELECTION L.J. 597, 610 (2005) (proposing a framework
for delaying presidential election in the event of a terrorist attack); Lawrence O. Gostin et al.,
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and
Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 622 (2002) (proposing a
framework for emergency measures in the face of dire public health threats). See also MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227 (2006).
159. See Evans, supra note 27, at 720–21.
160. Id. at 721.
161. Id. at 721 n. 57.
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they at least put in place a framework for monitoring what detainees
162
have suffered through, and for exposing abuses to public scrutiny.
The Commission has also taken up the question of how India
should answer terrorism. Soon after it was established, in 1993, the
Commission conducted a major inquiry into alleged abuses under the
163
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, or TADA.
TADA came up for renewal in 1995, at which point the Commission
sent a public letter to members of parliament recounting its findings
and calling for “this draconian law [to be] removed from the [s]tatute
book.”164 Parliament let the statute lapse.165 Pressure for expanded
governmental powers to combat terrorism did not abate, however,
and in 2001 a revised version of TADA was enacted over the
Commission’s first equivocal and then forceful objection.166
162. For more on the Commission’s successful efforts to get Indian states to enact
standardized procedures for reporting custodial deaths to the Commission, and videotaping
interrogations, see the Commission’s annual reports for 1993–94, 1995–96, 1997–98, 1990–2000,
2000–01, and 2002–03, available at http://nhrc.nic.in (follow “Archives” hyperlink). The
Commission appears to have induced state cooperation through a combination of public
pressure (naming laggard states in its annual report, and releasing frank and potentially
embarrassing letters written to state officials), and threats of Commission-led investigations.
The Commission has taken the position, for example, that a state’s failure to report a custodial
death within twenty-four hours “give[s] rise to a presumption . . . that an effort was being made
to suppress knowledge of the incident.” NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT
1993–1994 para. 5.4 (India) [hereinafter NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT
1993–1994], available at http://nhrc.nic.in (follow “Archives” hyperlink). While no legal
consequences as such attach to a Commission “finding” of prisoner abuse resulting in death, the
Commission may recommend compensation and/or prosecution, see, e.g., NAT’L HUMAN
RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1996–1997 para. 3.26 (India), available at http://nhrc.nic.in
(follow “Archives” hyperlink), and state leaders evidently seek to avoid being singled out for
such misdeeds.
163. See NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1993–1994, supra note 162,
para. 7.3; NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1994–1995 paras. 3.1–3.3, 4.1–4.6
& annexure I (India), available at http://nhrc.nic.in (follow “Archives” hyperlink).
164. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1994–1995, supra note 163,
annexure I.
165. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1995–1996 para. 4.1 (India),
available at http://nhrc.nic.in (follow “Archives” hyperlink).
166. The new anti-terrorism bill was drafted by the Law Commission of India, a body which,
unlike certain of the law commissions noted above, appears to be under the Government’s
control. See Early Developments, http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/main.htm#POSTINDEPENDENCE_DEVELOPMENTS (last visited Jan. 8, 2007) (indicating that “[t]he
Seventeenth Law Commission was constituted through a Government order [and] will have a
three-year term,” and that “[t]he Commission is empowered to have a few part-time Members
and/or Consultants depending upon the need and on the Approval of the Government”). At the
first meeting on the Law Commission’s draft, the chairperson of the Human Rights Commission
apparently spoke of need for “safeguards” and “legislation with a human face,” but did not
reject outright the Law Commission’s draft. LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, 173RD REPORT ON
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B. Engaging the Citizenry
That advisory counterparts are better positioned than
constitutional courts to craft legislative remedies is of little moment
unless the counterparts can also do something to bring about the
enactment of their proposed reforms. Reforms meant to check thenserving elected officials are unlikely to be adopted out of the
goodness of those officials’ hearts.167 In this respect, however, the
counterpart’s “problem” is not that different from the constitutional
168
court’s. Neither commands a police force or military. For the court
to win elected-branch compliance with its orders, or for the
counterpart to win elected-branch enactment of its proposed reforms,
the independent body generally must collaborate with some other
actor that can apply sanctions to elected-branch officials. In principle,
any number of actors might play the sanctioning role. For example,
the military, which might threaten a coup; or foreign powers, which
might withhold trade concessions or deny entry into trans-national
organizations. Although there are important questions to investigate
about how courts and counterparts might win compliance on account
of international pressure,169 this Article focuses on that ultimate
backstop of democratic political orders: the citizenry.

PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL, 2000 ch. 3, para. 3 (2000), available at
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/tada.htm. Later, however, the Human Rights Commission
denounced the bill as “unnecessary.” See NAT’L HUM. RTS. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2000–
2001 annexure I (India), available at http://nhrc.nic.in/annexDoc00_01.htm#no2.
167. This is not to deny that advisory counterparts sometimes play a useful role by
collaborating with like-minded but less well-informed legislators. Illustrative examples can be
found among state-level sentencing commissions in the United States, see Barkow, supra note
123, at 771–98 (2005); privacy commissions in Europe, see FLAHERTY, supra note 39, at 37–38,
64–66, 89 (discussing the politics of privacy and security in Germany); and anticorruption
commissions in Asia, see MANION, supra note 57, at 51–52, 204 (marveling at the
“remarkable . . . role of [Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption] as a
consultant at the stage of policy formulation or legislative drafting”). But this strategy for
counterpart influence obviously will not do in circumstances where the dominant coalition in
the legislature faces political incentives not to enact “appropriate legislation.”
168. “Rare and partial exceptions include the Commission on Elections in the Philippines,
which has been authorized to deploy the armed forces when necessary to ensure the conduct of
free and fair elections.” John Murphy, An Independent Electoral Commission, in FREE AND
FAIR ELECTIONS 25, 36 (Nico Steytler et al. eds., 1994).
169. The Danish NHRI, for one, appears to have gotten reforms enacted by appealing to
multinational organizations. See Kjaerum, supra note 23, at 115–16. Other countries have
established human rights commissions to defuse international criticism of their rights records,
see Sonia Cardenas, National Human Rights Commissions in Asia, in SOVEREIGNTY UNDER
CHALLENGE: HOW GOVERNMENTS RESPOND 55, 58–70 (John D. Montgomery & Nathan
Glazer eds., 2002), and it would not be surprising if a similar dynamic occasionally makes it hard
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Suppose that the elected branches have enacted policy x, which
170
the median voter does not oppose. The court or counterpart favors
y instead. Broadly speaking, there are two different ways in which a
court or counterpart might bring about pressure (mediated by public
opinion) for the elected branches to accede to y. The independent
body might do this by exercising authority with the median voter
concerning policies x and y; alternatively, the body might foster public
debate about the question at hand, as a result of which the median
voter revises her views about the relative merits of x and y.171
This Section develops a comparison of constitutional courts and
advisory counterparts as loci of authority and as instigators of public
debates about the meaning and application of a polity’s nominally
constitutive commitments. My aims are both positive and normative.
On the positive front, I advance some tentative hypotheses
concerning (1) the counterparts’ comparative advantage in
establishing what I shall term “persuasive authority” with the
electorate; and (2) the circumstances under which counterparts are
most authoritative. As well, I explore (3) how counterparts that do
not wield much authority regarding what should be done about the
policy question at hand may nonetheless get a public debate
underway; and (4) how counterpart-instigated debates differ from
court-triggered debates. On the normative front, I present a bare
sketch of how institutions set up to foster public discourse about
constitutional matters might be evaluated, and on this basis offer a
tentative defense of one model for debate-prompting counterparts.
1. Courts, Counterparts, and the Problem of Authoritative
Prescription. In a reasonably well-functioning democracy, it is to be
expected that independent (i.e., politically insulated) institutions will
often find it difficult to develop enough authority with the electorate
to mount an effective challenge to policies that are favored by the
to wave off the commission’s recommendations. Note also that foreign policy considerations are
sometimes said to account for compliance with constitutional court judgments in new
democracies. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 1, at 776–77 (arguing that elected branches in the
new democracies of Eastern Europe accepted binding judicial review as the price of admission
into the European Union).
170. Throughout this paper I will use “median voter” as shorthand to refer to the decisive or
“swing” segment of the electorate.
171. I shall bracket for purposes of this discussion a third possibility, namely, that the
independent body (e.g., a counterpart with investigatory powers) might be able to win electedbranch acceptance of its proposal by threatening to reveal to the general public politically
damaging information about elected-branch officials.
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elected branches of government. There are, however, several
different bases on which an independent body might claim the
median voter’s allegiance in disputes with the elected branches.
For one, the persons who serve on the body may occupy a social
station that commands deference. Perhaps they lead a religious
denomination to which the median voter belongs. Perhaps their class
is one to which “common” people regularly defer. This basis for
authority ought to wane, however, as national cultures democratize,
and I will set it aside for purposes of this Article.
Conventions about legality represent a second basis on which the
independent body might found its claim to authority. Regardless of
whether policy y (favored by the independent body) is a better fit
with the citizen’s underlying interests and concerns than policy x
(favored by the elected branches), citizens who understand the
independent body to have legal authority to make policy on behalf of
the polity, and who believe that the body has chosen y in the legally
authorized manner, may be prepared to retaliate against elected
officials who challenge that decision (unless the challenge itself runs
through the legally authorized channels, e.g., negating a Supreme
Court decision by constitutional amendment, or through the
appointments process, rather than by flouting a court order). The
vehemence with which citizens retaliate is likely to depend, inter alia,
on their commitment to rule-of-law values, and their confidence that
the independent body has complied with the relevant legality
convention.
Legal authority should be distinguished from persuasive
authority.172 An actor exercises persuasive authority if her
172. Note that I am using the terms “legal authority” and “persuasive authority” to refer to
bases on which an independent body may convince citizens to accept its prescriptions. Similar
terminology is employed in the literature concerning when and how U.S. judges should employ
foreign precedents for purposes of interpreting and applying the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g.,
David Fontana, The Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law
Scholarship: A Reply to Professor Tushnet, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 445 (2004) (using terms
“persuasive authority” and “binding authority” to characterize treatment of foreign
constitutional court decisions in U.S. constitutional adjudication). Needless to say, my analysis
has little to do with that debate, and I do not mean to allude to it with my choice of terminology.
I am concerned with the circumstances under which a public actor can get its target audience
(citizens) to accede to its prescriptions; presumably foreign judges do not often issue decisions
with the goal of seeing them followed in analogous cases by U.S. judges. In any event, the
foreign-law-in-domestic-constitutional-interpretation literature is more concerned with the
normative question of when and how U.S. judges should look to foreign precedents, rather than
the positive question of the circumstances under which U.S. judges will treat foreign decisions as
having persuasive or binding authority.
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endorsement of a policy provides information to listeners about the
balance of reasons that, from the listeners’ perspective, count in favor
173
of that course of action. In short, persuasive authority is concerned
with the substantive merits of the policy—whether it well suits
contemporary conditions and needs—whereas legal authority
provides a basis for following the authoritative actor’s directive
174
When an electorally
independent of the directive’s wisdom.
accountable official and a politically insulated actor disagree about
policy, the fact that the elected official must face the voters every so
often should tend to make her judgment more persuasive with those
voters. But under the right conditions, the independent actor may
develop persuasive authority with the electorate superior to that of
the nominally more accountable official.175 The independent actor
should prove comparatively persuasive insofar as (1) citizens think
the independent actor has information or expertise that the
electorally accountable official lacks; (2) citizens doubt the efficacy of
the electoral mechanism as a means of inducing public-regarding
behavior by the elected official (either in general or as to the specific
issue at hand); and/or (3) citizens regard the decisionmaking
procedures adopted by the independent actor as substantially aligning
that actor’s policy choices with the citizens’ concerns.
a. The Counterparts’ Persuasive Authority Advantage. The
central difference between constitutional courts and advisory
counterparts is that courts (in their adjudicative capacity) lay claim to
legal authority whereas counterparts (in their advisory capacity) do
not.176 But the counterparts are better positioned than constitutional
courts to develop persuasive authority. The counterparts’ persuasive
authority advantage derives from three factors: better information;

173. This idea is explored and formalized in ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS,
THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998).
174. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 28–31 (1986) (contrasting
“recognitional authority,” equivalent to what I have termed “persuasive authority,” with legal
authority).
175. By “persuasive authority with the electorate,” I mean the capacity to shift aggregate
public opinion (among likely voters) in the direction of the actor’s preferred policy.
176. This is not to say that constitutional courts, though they claim legal authority, will
exercise much authority in practice. In well-established democracies with long-standing
constitutional courts, the citizenry does tend to recognize the legal authority of those courts. In
new democracies, the picture is mixed. See generally James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira,
Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional
Court, 65 J. POL. 1, 3–6 (2003), and sources cited therein.
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the ability (in the case of some counterparts) to initiate and carry out
investigations of official wrongdoing; and greater flexibility to
develop democratic credentials for the body’s decisions without
undermining other sources of authority.
i. Information. Advisory counterparts can assure the public
that their recommendations derive from careful study and an
empirically grounded understanding of the problem at hand. The
counterparts may commission studies, develop in-house technical
expertise, hold hearings open to anyone interested or curious, talk
through possible remedies with interest groups and lawmakers, and
more. Appellate courts, by contrast, typically have little policymaking
expertise and minimal fact-finding capacity. To be sure, policy
expertise, without more, is unlikely to yield substantial persuasive
authority for constitutional courts or advisory counterparts. The
project of specifying and implementing a democratic society’s basic
ideals, or, less grandiosely, of making human-rights or opengovernment or election-law policy, is given to normative disputation.
It is not a merely technocratic endeavor. But insofar as average voters
overcome their initial skepticism about policymaking in such domains
by a politically insulated body, they are more likely to be persuaded
of the merits of counterpart-issued reforms than judge-made policies.
The counterpart, as the better informed body, is less likely to miss its
mark.
ii. Investigations. Several advisory counterparts have scored
legislative victories following investigations that revealed high-level
abuse of office. In Ghana, for example, an inquiry by the Commission
for Human Rights and Administrative Justice into corruption among
government ministers and the President’s staff was widely covered in
the press and resulted in several resignations.177 The Commission
urged the government to adopt new asset disclosure requirements.178
Initially the government balked, but after a public outcry it reversed
179
course and adopted the Commission’s proposals. In New South
Wales, Australia, the anticorruption commission’s investigation into
travel-allowance abuses by members of parliament created such a stir

177. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 160–61; INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
POL’Y, supra note 7, at 17.
178. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 161.
179. Id.
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that, grudgingly, the legislature finally acceded to the commission’s
proposal for a formal legislative Code of Conduct and changes to
180
In Queensland, Australia, an
travel voucher administration.
investigation into police and electoral corruption by an ad hoc
independent commission generated such a public outcry that “all
political parties pledg[ed] to implement [the commission’s]
181
recommendations, prior to the report being completed.” In the
United Kingdom, governmental foot-dragging on the Electoral
Commission’s ballot security recommendations became an issue in
the 2005 general election campaign, thanks in part to the fortuitously
timed conviction of six Labour Party city councilors on charges of
vote fraud.182
That independent advisory bodies have prevailed following
scandal should not come as a surprise. Analyzing U.S. data, the
political scientist Luke Keele has shown that scandals have large
effects on public trust in government, often for a period of years, and
that in the wake of scandals lawmakers typically put on a big show of
supporting structural, putatively “good government” reforms.183
Insofar as the elected branches have fallen into disrepute, reforms
issuing from a politically insulated body should look comparatively
appealing.
This scandal dynamic could work to the advantage of courts as
well as counterparts. The key difference is that counterparts with de
jure authority to initiate and carry out investigations of governmental
wrongdoing are better positioned than constitutional courts to
“create” scandals in the first instance (by undertaking to reveal
official malfeasance), and in so doing to claim credit and bolster their
184
image in the public’s eye.

180. Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1390–91.
181. Colleen Lewis & Jenny Fleming, The Everyday Politics of Value Conflict: External
Independent Oversight Bodies in Australia, in GOVERNMENT REFORMED: VALUES AND NEW
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 167, 176 (Ian Holland & Jenny Fleming eds., 2003).
182. For a brief narrative of the politics of ballot security reform in the U.K., see Elmendorf,
supra note 62, at 1396–1404.
183. Luke Keele, Social Capital, Government Performance, and the Dynamics of Trust in
Government 20 (Oct. 23, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/
Politics/papers/2005/Keele%20MacroTrust.pdf.
184. Which is not to say that the creation of such scandals is normatively desirable. For a
discussion of some of the problems, see infra Part II.B.2.a.ii.
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iii. Tradeoffs Between Legal and Persuasive Authority. That the
median voter has suspicions about the good faith or competence of
her elected representative does not mean that she will necessarily
trust the policymaking judgment of some comparatively insulated
body. She might just as well end up distrustful of both. The
counterpart (or court) that seeks persuasive authority with the
electorate must somehow establish that its own structure and method
of decisionmaking result in sensible policy prescriptions—
prescriptions that respond to the citizenry’s ideals and concerns.
To this end, many advisory counterparts consult extensively with
the public in developing recommendations, and seek to defend their
proposals on the basis of these consultation practices. At the
forefront are the law revision commissions, which have no
investigative or administrative responsibilities to go with their law
reform role and, as such, must justify their existence entirely in terms
of their contributions to law reform.185 Illustrative is the Law
Commission of Canada, whose organic act establishes an Advisory
Council composed of twelve to twenty-four persons “broadly
representative of the socio-economic and cultural diversity of
Canada.”186 The Council is to “advise the Commission on . . . strategic
direction and long-term program[s] of stud[y] and [to] review . . . the
187
Commission’s performance.” As well, the Commission is authorized
to set up “study panel[s]” of affected or especially knowledgeable
188
The Commission
persons in relation to particular projects.
embraced a participation-oriented vision for law reform. In its own
words: the Commission aimed to “address the concerns of Canadians
about the law, legal process and legal institutions,” by making
“creative,”
“balanced,”
and
“responsive”
law
reform
recommendations.189 “Inclusiveness” came first on the Commission’s
190
list of self-ascribed Guiding Principles. The Commission committed
itself to “open[ness]” in its “day-to-day activities” and to

185. That law commissions are attempting to carve out niches grounded in publicconsultation practices is a recurring theme in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, a
collection of essays on law reform commissions around the world.
186. Law Commission of Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. 9, § 18(1.2) (1996).
187. Id. § 19.
188. Id. § 20(1).
189. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., STRATEGIC AGENDA AND RESEARCH PLAN (on file with
author).
190. Id.
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“consult[ing] widely—not just with jurists and those who have a
191
professional concern with the law—but with Canadians generally.”
In the U.K., the Electoral Commission has made a point of
calibrating its campaign finance recommendations to the findings of
192
The Electoral
Commission-sponsored public opinion studies.
Commission is no slave to public whim, however. The Commission
has tried to draw attention to internal inconsistencies in the public’s
policy preferences, and to differences between pre- and post193
deliberation opinion. I suspect that as new techniques for taking the
measure of “informed” public opinion are tested and refined (such as
James Fishkin’s Deliberative Polls194 and the British Columbia
195
Citizens’ Assembly ), many advisory counterparts will prove to be
enthusiastic adopters and will increasingly anchor their
recommendations to public opinion so revealed. This, in turn, will
bolster public confidence in the counterparts’ prescriptions.196
For constitutional courts, however, the pursuit of persuasive
authority through participatory decisionmaking procedures can be
rather more hazardous. Persuasive authority is undoubtedly useful for
197
policy-minded courts, but so too is legal authority, and the pursuit
of one may come at some cost to the other. In the United States, for
example, the citizens who most strongly support the Supreme Court
subscribe to what political scientists John Scheb and William Lyons
call the “myth of legality,” the notion that constitutional holdings are
driven mainly by original intent and precedent.198

191. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 92.
192. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1439–40 & nn. 313–316.
193. Id.
194. Information about which is available at Ctr. for Deliberative Democracy, Deliberative
Polling: Toward a Better-Informed Democracy, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary
(last visited Jan. 6, 2007).
195. Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, Improving Democracy in B.C., http://www.
citizensassembly.bc.ca/public (last visited Jan. 6, 2007); see also DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC
RENEWAL (Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse eds., forthcoming).
196. Cf. Fred Cutler et al., The B.C. Citizens’ Assembly as Agenda-Setter: Shaking Up Voter
Choice, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL, supra note 195 (analyzing how perceived
“legitimacy,” “ordinariness,” and “expertise” of the Citizens’ Assembly affected how poll
respondents intended to vote on Assembly-proposed electoral reforms).
197. This is because orders whose substance the citizenry deems favorable are less likely to
suffer foot-dragging implementation by the executive branch. Over the long run, moreover,
constitutional courts that exercise persuasive authority should be able to pursue a wider range
of policies without undercutting public support for the practice of constitutional judicial review.
198. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the
Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928 (2000).
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This creates something of a dilemma for the Court. On the one
hand, the Court might well develop more persuasive authority if the
Justices acknowledged their discretion and cashed out the opentextured clauses of the Constitution in ways that appear substantially
199
responsive to citizens’ concerns —but doing so might undermine
public faith in the idea that constitutional adjudication is a distinctly
200
Conversely, by acting as if decisions in
legal undertaking.
constitutional cases are determined by text, precedent, and original
intent, the Justices can shore up their legal authority, yet this hardly
builds confidence that judicial rulings fit contemporary conditions and
needs. There is also some basis for thinking that plain-old
obscurantism about how judges reach decisions may reinforce the
legal-authority convention,201 although judicial obscurantism certainly
doesn’t help citizens to infer whether the court’s decisions are likely
to make sense on policy grounds.
To be sure, there is no logical incompatibility between a
constitutional court’s development of persuasive authority and its
maintenance of legal authority. One can imagine a legal order in
which—as Ethan Leib has recommended—large questions about the

199. Cf. ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A
POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 67–69 (2004) (recommending that the Supreme Court
involve deliberative assemblies of citizens in identifying and fleshing out the contours of
fundamental rights).
200. Cf. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular
Expectations Regarding the Factors That Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV.
181 (2001) (demonstrating that citizens’ ratings of Supreme Court performance can be
explained, in part, by perceptions about whether the Court relies on proper or improper factors
in making decisions).
201. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596,
2617 (2003) (discussing work by political scientists suggesting that “diffuse support for courts is
highest the less people know about what courts are doing”); id. at 2631–35 (discussing ways in
which the U.S. Supreme Court may sustain diffuse support for the Court and its work by
keeping a low profile). Some political scientists have argued that non-outcome-based support
for constitutional judicial review is highest among persons who know enough to be familiar with
judicial symbolism, but not so much that they grasp the substance of many court decisions. See,
e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 658–60 (1992) (describing differential bases of support for U.S.
Supreme Court among mass public and self-reported “opinion leaders”); James L. Gibson et al.,
On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 349–51 (1998)
(describing results from a twenty-country survey which show that awareness of constitutional
courts—which the authors interpret as “greater exposure to the legitimizing symbols associated
with high courts”—tends to be correlated with diffuse support); cf. Scheb & Lyons, supra note
198, at 934–35 (summarizing results from national survey showing that “the most attentive
segment of the public is far more likely to espouse the myth of legality than are the less attentive
segments”).
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content of rights are referred by the constitutional court to
202
deliberative assemblies composed of randomly selected laypersons.
But where citizens adhere to another, quite different idea about what
it means for a court to decide constitutional questions in the legally
authorized way, it is doubtful that constitutional courts can move in
Leib’s direction without putting their legal authority at risk.
Notice finally that the counterparts are less likely than
constitutional courts to squander whatever persuasive authority they
do accumulate by inadvertently alienating powerful blocs of voters.
Before launching an all-out campaign for the enactment of reforms,
counterparts can test the waters with public opinion studies, float
tentative ideas, and monitor reactions to their investigations. The
counterparts may time their selection of issues to moments of
heightened public interest, and openly adjust their stance in response
to public feedback (thereby demonstrating responsiveness).203 By
contrast, the judicial conventions of speaking to an issue only when
called upon, and only through the confines of a formal opinion,
makes it comparatively difficult for the court to time its interventions
adroitly and to defuse adverse public reactions to particular
holdings—even as it reinforces the impression that constitutional
courts act in uniquely legal (as opposed to political) capacity.204
iv. Summary. Policy-minded constitutional courts and advisory
counterparts face somewhat different problems of authority. Courts

202. LEIB, supra note 199, at 67–69.
203. To be sure, justices of constitutional courts may choose to speak in a variety of ways,
not just through judicial opinions. Thus, as Judith Resnik has shown, the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court actually employed a double-barreled, adjudication-plusadvice-giving strategy to advance his federalism objectives: on the one hand deciding cases that
establish new sovereign immunity doctrines and restrictive glosses on Congress’s Commerce
Clause and Section 5 powers, and on the other using his annual report to Congress on the
federal judiciary and his position as chair of the Judicial Conference to counsel against the
creation of new federal rights of action (nominally on the ground that the federal courts are
backlogged). See Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and
Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000). It is significant,
though, that when the Judicial Conference speaks to Congress, it does so nominally to address
the institutional needs of the judiciary, not to weigh in on constitutional questions or priorities.
See id.
204. Cf. Rosalee A. Clawson & Eric N. Waltenburg, Support for a Supreme Court
Affirmative Action Decision: A Story in Black and White, 31 AM. POL. RES. 251 (2003) (noting
that the U.S. Supreme Court “is in a remarkably weak position when it comes to constructing or
‘framing’ the way in which the public understands its articulation of policy,” and testing effects
of media-furnished frames on public response to the Court’s affirmative action decisions).
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may enhance the probability of elected-branch compliance with their
constitutional decrees by bolstering their legal authority, persuasive
authority, or both. The counterparts depend on persuasive authority.
Although this dependence puts the counterparts at some risk of being
ignored, the counterparts are also, in certain respects, better
positioned than constitutional courts to develop persuasive authority.
This follows from the counterparts’ superior policy expertise; from
(some) counterparts’ authority and capacity to undertake
investigations of elected branch officials; and from the counterparts’
freedom to pursue strategies for enhancing their persuasive authority
that, if followed by a constitutional court, could jeopardize the court’s
legal authority.
b. On Issue- and Occasion-Specific Influence.
That
counterparts have a persuasive authority advantage over
constitutional courts does not reveal anything about the conditions, if
any, under which counterparts can mount an effective challenge to
policies that are favored by the dominant faction in the elected
branches. The U.S. Supreme Court exercises little persuasive
authority.205 To say that a counterpart is likely to develop more
persuasive authority does not mean that it will develop enough to
make a difference.
My working hypothesis, consistent with the available evidence
(all anecdotal), is that advisory counterparts can wield significant
205. For summaries of the literature, see VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 8–9, 16–21 (2003); Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being
Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1290–94 (2004).
A few laboratory studies have indicated that persons who say they trust the Court will, after
learning of a Court decision, adjust their views on the merits of the question at hand. See
Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Opinion Change: An Experimental Study of the
Court’s Ability to Change Opinion, 23 AM. POL. Q. 109 (1995); Jeffery J. Mondak, Institutional
Legitimacy, Policy Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court, 20 AM. POL. Q. 457 (1992); Jeffery J.
Mondak, Perceived Legitimacy of Supreme Court Decisions: Three Functions of Source
Credibility, 12 POL. BEHAV. 363 (1990); Jeffery J. Mondak, Political Legitimacy and the
Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts of Legitimation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 675 (1994); cf.
Clawson & Waltenburg, supra note 204, at 251 (finding the effect mediated by media framing).
But see Larry R. Baas & Dan Thomas, The Supreme Court and Policy Legitimation:
Experimental Tests, 12 AM. POL. Q. 335 (1984) (finding no effect). Outside the laboratory,
however, the evidence for such effects is weak. See HOEKSTRA, supra, at 87–93. Most Court
decisions seem to go largely unnoticed beyond the community where the underlying dispute
originated. Id. at 51–53. Within the community of origin, public awareness is often high, yet the
Court’s influence on local opinion about the merits is small and not readily explained, id. at 87–
113, 151–53, although locally unpopular decisions have substantial and negative repercussions
for local opinions about the Court itself, id. at 115–47, 154–55.
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persuasive authority with the electorate on election law and
government integrity questions, particularly in the wake of scandals,
but that as to other kinds of issues counterparts will rarely develop
enough persuasive authority to pressure elected officials into
adopting counterpart-proposed reforms.
I have already noted several examples of anticorruption bodies
that, following scandals, rallied public opinion and prevailed upon the
elected branches to adopt reforms about which the lawmakers were
206
less than keen. Even without a boost from scandal, a number of
election-law advisory commissions appear to have achieved a
significant level of influence. The advisory redistricting commissions
found in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the state of Iowa are
cases in point.207 These bodies periodically draw up proposed revisions
to constituency boundaries, which are then forwarded to the
legislature for deliberation and a vote. Typically the advisory body’s
proposal is accepted by the legislature—even if it disadvantages
incumbents.208 Local observers report that lawmakers’ fear of a public
backlash (should they ultimately reject the nonpartisan proposal) is a
209
significant factor behind this pattern of deference.
In Canada, the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO)—the nonpartisan
and long-tenured head of the national election administration
agency—has become an influential figure in electoral reform
210
debates. The CEO successfully prevailed upon the government to
enact caps on independent expenditures in electoral campaigns,
among other reforms. The government typically seeks CEO input
before floating election law proposals to the public, and elected
officials have been lampooned for disregarding the CEO’s
recommendations.
Consider also the still-unfolding controversy in the United
Kingdom over postal voting and ballot security.211 Although the
timing of the Labour city councilors’ vote-fraud conviction surely had
much to do with making the Electoral Commission’s ballot-security
recommendations an issue in the 2005 general election campaign, this

206. See supra Part II.B.1.a.ii.
207. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1386–90.
208. Id. at 1388–90.
209. Id. at 1389.
210. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An Overview,
5 ELECTION L.J. 425, 426 (2006).
211. Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1396–1404.
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was not the first time the government has come under pressure to act
on Commission-proposed reforms. Since 2003, the Electoral
Commission has been pressing the government to improve ballot
security; the Commission proposes, among other things, switching
from the current household-based registration system to one based on
the individual.212 The incumbent Labour government apparently fears
that adoption of the Commission’s preferred voter registration system
213
might diminish turnout among traditional Labour constituencies.
The Commission itself has offered only muted criticism of the
214
government’s failure to adopt its central recommendations.
However, leading opposition figures have been vociferous critics of
the government’s foot-dragging on Commission recommendations,
charging the government with venal partisanship and pledging their
own support for the Commission’s proposals.215 (This despite the fact
that the Commission and the government share many objectives,
including lowering the cost of voting and introducing other measures
to improve turnout among the disaffected.216) In focusing their attack
on the gap between what the Commission has urged and the
government has done, opposition figures have managed to ridicule
the government for “playing politics” with the integrity of the
electoral system, while insulating themselves against the symmetric
countercharge.217 The government, in response, has labored to show
its support for other Electoral Commission proposals.218 During the
heat of the 2005 election campaign, the Labour government finally
said that, if returned to power, it would introduce a voter registration
bill in line with the Commission’s recommendations.219 Several
months after the election the Government brought forth a bill that

212. Id. at 1395–1404.
213. During the spring 2005 general election campaign, a front-page story in the Sunday
Times featured leaked minutes from a cabinet committee meeting the previous year, revealing
that the government had drawn up legislation to enact key Electoral Commission
recommendations, including individualized voter registration, but that the project was
mothballed “after a government-commissioned study showed it would reduce the turnout of key
Labour voters such as the young and poor.” Robert Winnett & David Leppard, Ministers
Ditched Vital Measures to Stop Voting Fraud, SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, at 1.
214. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1395–1404.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1396–97, 1400.
217. Id. at 1397–1404.
218. Id. at 1400.
219. Id. at 1401–03.
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goes part way toward the Commission’s position, and the debate
220
continues.
The counterparts’ apparent strength on election-law questions is,
I suspect, related to the scandal phenomenon. This is not just because
scandals (in a temporal sense) and election-law questions (in an issue221
specific sense ) both draw into doubt the usual presumption that the
prospect of a coming election is enough to make the elected branches
responsive to the voters’ interests and concerns. I have argued in
previous work that a politician’s opposition to an independent body’s
electoral reform recommendation can signal that she has elevated her
self interest above what she understands to be the public interest.222
For the large number of voters who have weak policy preferences but
a strong desire for lawmakers to behave in a public spirited fashion,
this signal may function as a rare and important cue to the lawmaker’s
223
character.
If I am right about this, the counterparts’ influence on electionlaw and government-integrity issues may well depend on their
exercise of persuasive authority, without being wholly explained by
the exercise of authority. The body’s persuasive authority matters
because if citizens didn’t think the counterpart-proposed reform was
in the public interest, they would have little basis for inferring
venality from their elected representative’s opposition. But the
strength of the public reaction reflects much more than
disappointment over the representative’s failure to support a sensible
reform.
Beyond the election law and anticorruption domains, the
anecdotal evidence suggests that advisory counterparts rarely if ever
wield enough authority with the electorate to generate bottom-up
pressure for the enactment of counterpart-proposed reforms.224
220. Information about the recently introduced Electoral Administration Bill is available on
the Electoral Commission’s website, Electoral Administration Act, http://www.
electoralcommission.org.uk/elections/eladbill.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 2007).
221. The risk is that incumbents will favor electoral regulations that thwart political
competition.
222. Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1421–23.
223. Id.
224. To be sure, it does not follow that these bodies are inconsequential. They may
contribute to public discourse in various ways. They might collaborate productively with likeminded legislators, see supra note 167, or even with constitutional courts, see infra Part III. And
some may be able to use their powers of investigation to pressure administrative agencies or
even lawmakers into enacting reforms. For example, I suspect that the success of the National
Human Rights Commission of India in reforming custodial interrogation practices may be due
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Elected officials seem quite comfortable disregarding the
recommendations of law reform commissions, human rights
225
This is not
commissions, privacy commissions, and the like.

in part to the Commission’s declaration that it “is of a prima-facie view that the local doctor [in
conducting autopsies] succumbs to police pressure which leads to distortion of the facts.” See
NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1995–1996, supra note 165, annexure IV.
By adopting the Commission-recommended videotaping protocol, local authorities may have
been able to reassure the Commission of their good faith and thereby reduce the likelihood of
costly and potentially embarrassing Commission-led investigations into custodial deaths.
225. Michael Kirby, the former chairperson of the Australian Law Reform Commission and
a long-time observer of law commissions worldwide, remarks:
There remains . . . an institutional flaw that has yet to be solved. This is how to secure
governmental, legislative and official attention once law reform reports are produced.
Nowhere has this issue been tackled institutionally and effectively. . . . [A]ll too often,
law reform proposals go to the bottom of the ministerial and legislative pile. They
secure much less attention than the political ideas and personality and party schemes
that dominate contemporary politics.
Kirby, supra note 79, at 445. The Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission reports that while the Commission has established memoranda of understanding
with many government agencies and commented on their practices to good effect, “we cannot
honestly claim that the UK Government has taken our concerns on legislative proposals
seriously.” Brice Dickson, The Contribution of Human Rights Commissions to the Protection of
Human Rights, 47 PUB. L. 272, 278–80 (2003). “[S]ome of us,” he laments, “are beginning to
wonder whether the effort we put into our work is worth it.” Id. at 280. Sonia Cardenas, who
studied the NHRIs of India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, concludes: “All three national
commissions have been unable to enforce their recommendations in the face of concerted
government opposition . . . . When government officials have not had an interest in
implementing the recommendations of these Commissions, they have simply not done so.”
Cardenas, supra note 169, at 69.
For their work on prison conditions, human rights commissions in South Africa and
Mexico have been lambasted in the media as “soft on crime.” INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN
RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 96–97. South Africa’s parliament has declined even to debate
the recommendations put forth in its human rights commission’s annual reports. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 307–08. The commission, in protest, quit making legislative
recommendations. Id. at 308.
The examples can be multiplied. Early proponents of the United States Sentencing
Commission envisioned a body with the practical moral authority to cool down the heated
politics of crime and criminal sentencing. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 118–24 (1972). As well as issuing guidelines for judges to
follow, the Commission would, over time, encourage the legislature to remove arbitrary
disparities in the criminal code that “politics of crime” frenzies occasionally ensconce. Yet the
Commission’s repeated efforts to get Congress to reduce the massive disparity in sentences for
federal drug crimes involving crack and powdered cocaine, a disparity whose burden falls on the
African-American community, have come to naught. Barkow, supra note 123, at 767–68.
Barkow’s comparative study of state-level sentencing commissions suggests that some
commissions have had an impact by producing fiscal-impact data for the consumption of
budget-minded legislators. But there is no evidence that any commission has made a mark by
appealing to the moral sensibilities of lawmakers or citizens.
Similarly, David Flaherty’s careful study of privacy commissioners in Europe shows that
they have worked effectively with privacy advocates in parliament, but Flaherty does not
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surprising. The conflicts of interest that arise when elected officials
legislate on matters concerning the ground-rules of political
competition or legislative ethics do not generally contaminate human
rights or privacy policy. There is little reason for voters to doubt the
efficacy of the electoral mechanism in securing responsive
policymaking in these domains (insofar as it secures responsive
policymaking at all), or to infer that elected officials who reject the
recommendations of an independent advisory body have done so out
of self-interest.
2. Commanding Attention, Focusing Debate. Suppose I am
right that independent advisory bodies can wield significant
persuasive authority with the electorate regarding election law and
government integrity policies—particularly in the wake of scandals—
but that such authority is improbable as to other policy problems,
especially at other times. The next question to investigate is whether
counterparts that lack persuasive authority concerning their proposed
reforms might nonetheless move onto the public agenda the problems
they’ve identified, and get a vigorous debate underway.
Debate-triggering might enable counterparts to effect structural
reforms beyond the election-law and government-integrity domains.
Suppose that a counterpart calls for certain reforms which are likely
to win favor with an engaged, informed public, but which currently
have little citizen support. The instigation of a high-profile debate
through which voters learn about the issues could produce bottom-up
pressure for the enactment of those reforms. A counterpart’s
fomenting of public debate might also be valued in its own right,
whether or not it leads to the enactment of normatively attractive
reforms. Some proponents of judicial review advance a related
argument. Barry Friedman, for example, posits that “[p]rompting,
maintaining, and focusing [public] debate about constitutional
meaning is the primary function of judicial review.”226

indicate that commissioner reports have in any way changed the politics of privacy. See
FLAHERTY, supra note 39, at 37–38, 64–66, 89 (discussing the politics of privacy and security in
Germany). Statist and security-minded legislators pay no heed to privacy recommendations and
apparently suffer no political cost for this. Id. at 64–66.
226. Friedman, supra note 205, at 1295–96; see also EISGRUBER, supra note 128, at 96–107
(explaining the Supreme Court’s role in framing constitutional questions for public debate);
ROBERT J. LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS 228–237 (2000) (defending judge-led
“constitutional revolutions” as means of inducing considered, society-wide reflection on
meaning of constitutional commitments). But see TUSHNET, supra note 157 (defending
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The convention of binding judicial review gives constitutional
courts a powerful tool with which to attract public attention. Strike
down a law that has a significant base of popular or interest-group
support, and the people will hear about it. Opponents of the court’s
decision will put up a fuss; politicians may threaten retaliation against
the court (budget cuts, jurisdiction stripping); and the decision will be
227
trotted out in future confirmation hearings. Or uphold a law in a
manner that seems to curtail some widely treasured right, and in short
order legislatures will be debating new rights-protective bills.228

“populist” constitutional law, while suggesting that judicial interventions undermine rather than
support popular engagement with constitutional meaning).
227. There is a nascent political science literature on the agenda-setting effects of Supreme
Court decisions. Analyzing the impact of the thirty-one decisions concerning school
desegregation, church-state relations, or free speech between 1947 and 1992 that were
contemporaneously rated as “major” by Congressional Quarterly, researchers found that seven
appeared to have a significant impact on the frequency of media coverage of associated issues
(although in two of these instances, there were confounding events), and that four of the seven
cases had a significant, long term “step effect” on media coverage. See Roy B. Flemming et al.,
One Voice Among Many: The Supreme Court’s Influence on Attentiveness to Issues in the United
States, 1947–92, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1224 (1997) [hereinafter Flemming et al., One Voice Among
Many]. Those four cases (which dealt with school desegregation, religious instruction in public
schools, school prayer, and flag burning) put an issue on the agenda, and it stayed there. (Note
that the authors used media coverage as a proxy for public attention, for want of adequate timeseries data on the public opinion concerning issue importance.)
In a subsequent study of civil rights, civil liberties, and the environment, Flemming and
his colleagues analyzed the interplay among the “systemic agenda” (media coverage) and the
“institutional agendas” of the president, Congress, and the Supreme Court, as measured,
respectively, by the president’s attention to the issue in State of the Union addresses, by the
percentage of congressional hearing-days given over to the issue, and by the share of the Court’s
docket pertaining to the issue. See Roy B. Flemming et al., Attention to Issues in a System of
Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy Agendas, 61 J. POL. 76 (1999). They
concluded that “[t]he Supreme Court appears extremely important in the areas of civil rights
and civil liberties policy,” affecting the attention paid to these issues by the elected branches and
the media. Id. at 104. The results “suggest a pattern in which the Supreme Court alters attention
by elected institutions, which in turn produces greater media attention for civil rights. This
pattern also implies that Supreme Court attention may increase the level of conflict,
subsequently drawing the president, Congress, and larger system into the fray.” Id. at 92.
The intuition that the Supreme Court can draw attention to a problem by striking down
high-profile laws and creating controversy is also suggested by empirical studies of the impact of
the Court’s abortion and capital punishment decisions on public opinion concerning these
issues, which show a polarization effect. See Danette Brickman & David A.M. Peterson, Public
Opinion Reaction to Repeated Events: Citizen Response to Multiple Supreme Court Abortion
Decisions, 28 POL. BEHAV. 87 (2006); Charles Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican
Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
751 (1989); Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s Conditional Response to
Supreme Court Decisions, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 299 (1998).
228. Consider the responses to Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). The former, of course, gave rise to the
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This Section discusses several methods by which advisory
counterparts may generate public debate. Then, as a thought
experiment, I suggest a model for debate-initiation predicated on
what might be termed “constitutional priority setting.” The Section
concludes with a preliminary treatment of the normatively significant
differences between constitutional courts and priority-setting
counterparts as dialogic institutions.
One terminological note before moving on: I shall use the terms
“debate forcing,” “debate triggering,” and “public agenda setting”
interchangeably, to refer to any process by which an advisory
counterpart or constitutional court bolsters an issue’s salience to the
citizenry.
a. Advisory Counterparts and the Public Agenda: Three
Methods for Inducing Debate.
i. Education. Advisory counterparts have tried to move issues
onto the public agenda using a range of educational and
propagandistic techniques. In South Africa, the Human Rights
Commission has promoted human rights awareness through major229
media advertising campaigns. Ghana’s NHRI has worked with
traditional community leaders to change the customary mistreatment
of women considered to be witches.230 NHRIs have also worked
closely with public schools to introduce human-rights themes into the
231
classroom.
On the public integrity front, Hong Kong’s Independent
Commission Against Corruption is credited with dramatically
transforming public opinion about both the extent and the propriety

Religious Freedom Restoration Act at the national level, and eventually many “state RFRAs”
as well. (For a compendium of state RFRAs, see Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and
Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 607 n.4 (1999).) Regarding the response to
Kelo, see David Barron, Eminent Domain is Dead! (Long Live Eminent Domain!), BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2006, at D1; Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of
New London, Sweet Home v. Babbitt, and other Tales from the Supreme Court 24–50 (Univ. of
Houston Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 2006-W-02), available at http://search.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=895008 (last visited Jan. 16, 2007); the National Conference of
State Legislatures, Eminent Domain, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/emindomain.htm
(last visited Jan. 7, 2007).
229. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 297–98.
230. Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 43.
231. Id.
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232
of bribe-paying. The Commission’s early, high-profile investigations
of police syndicates may have had much to do with this,233 but the
Commission has also worked assiduously to convey its message
through “television dramas, radio call-in shows, posters, and public
announcements,” and by “meeting with community groups, visiting
door to door, going to factories and schools, and working in a variety
234
of other ways to directly contact ordinary citizens . . . .”
I am not aware of any academic studies that evaluate
counterparts’ success in influencing the terms of political debate
through such endeavors. One should not discount the possible
efficacy of agenda-setting by noisy harping, however, particularly
where the counterpart is well-funded and has authority to sponsor
advertisements. There is a school of political psychology which holds
that voters’ judgments about public priorities are partly sub235
rational. In any given election, the story goes, voters focus on issues
to which they are “primed” to attend by mass media coverage, issueadvertising campaigns, and the like.236 If this is so, a counterpart that
can fill the airways may affect the issues that come to mind when
voters evaluate candidates, even if the counterpart has no influence
whatever on what voters consider to be sound policy with respect to
the issue at hand.

ii. Investigation.
Investigations offer another way for
counterparts to move their issues to the center of public debate.
Recall the hope of the lawmakers who launched the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights: that a steady stream of Commission inquiries would
reveal to the American people the true horrors of the Jim Crow
South, generating public support for aggressive federal civil rights
legislation. To a significant degree this hope was realized: early
investigations by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights were widely
covered in the press and helped to frame the first generation of

232.
233.
234.
235.

See generally MANION, supra note 57, at 27–83.
See id. at 34–36, 40.
Id. at 43–48.
See generally STEPHEN P. NICHOLSON, VOTING THE AGENDA: CANDIDATES,
ELECTIONS, AND BALLOT PROPOSITIONS 15–23 (2005) (reviewing political psychology
literature on agenda-setting and priming).
236. Id.; see also SHANTO INENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS (1987)
(tracing effects of news coverage on citizen perceptions of issue importance).
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237
national civil rights legislation. NHRIs in other countries have
occasionally led high profile investigations as well,238 and
investigations by anticorruption commissions often prove
newsworthy. The Hong Kong ICAC’s probe into police syndicates
received substantial public attention, and marked the beginning of the
ICAC’s successful effort to transform public opinion about the extent
239
and propriety of bribe paying. In Ghana and in New South Wales,
Australia, investigations by anticorruption commissions forced top
government officials to resign and spurred the adoption of new
240
laws.
As an agenda-setting strategy, the carrying out of an
investigation can work on two levels. Most basically, the investigating
body may change the focus of public discourse by releasing into the
public domain previously suppressed information. On another level,
the very act of investigating may be dramatic and attention-grabbing,
especially if top government officials are forced to testify under oath
241
or turn over documents. The whiff of scandal—are the top guns
telling the truth?—may be enough to corral public attention.

237. DULLES, supra note 34, at 38 (“[T]he Alabama [voting] registration officials’
contumacious defiance of the Civil Rights Commission and its Attorney General’s outspoken
challenge to [the Commission’s subpoena] authority were headlined and editorialized about
from coast to coast.”); id. at 63–64 (“Newspapers throughout the country gave the
[Commission’s First] Report extensive coverage. . . .”); id. at 105 (“[The Commission] enjoyed,
at least in the North, a very good press.”).
238. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 298 (noting that the South African
Human Rights Commission stirred controversy with its investigation into alleged racism in the
mainstream media); INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 73–74
(describing inquiries pursued by Australian NHRI with goal of getting structural reforms on the
public agenda); Evans, supra note 27, at 719 (noting general significance of NHRI
investigations, and giving example investigation into military and police brutality in Indonesia);
Lindsnaes & Linholdt, supra note 7, at 43 (noting successful investigation into police cells and
prison conditions by Ghanaian NHRI, which led Government to introduce reforms).
239. MANION, supra note 57, at 39–41, 44, 46 (describing early investigations and noting role
of “(favorable) media coverage of enforcement actions” in “publiciz[ing] the ICAC and its
reliability as an anticorruption organization”).
240. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 160–61 (regarding resignations brought
about by corruption investigations in Ghana); Lewis & Fleming, supra note 181, at 173–74
(regarding resignations brought about by corruption investigations in New South Wales,
Australia).
241. Cf. Jonathan Simon, Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and
Executive Power in an Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419 (2005) (discussing the social and
political impact of ad hoc commissions set up to investigate public wrongdoing, and remarking
on the drama of testimony by top government officials).
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As an institutional design solution to the “problem” of public
disinterest in counterpart-proposed reforms, however, equipping the
advisory body with coercive powers of investigation is both limited
and problematic. It is limited because the release of information, as
such, will only spur public debate insofar as there is latent public
concern about the question at hand. It is problematic because
politically insulated counterparts may have incentives to scandal
monger—and, more particularly, to go on the attack against top
government officials. Counterparts that succeed in “exposing” elected
officials as short-sighted, corrupt, venal, in the hock to special
interests, etc., stand to gain in effective authority.242 But such
muckraking is far from costless. The officials under investigation may
243
be seriously distracted from the business of governing. Public
attention may be diverted away from the substantive problems that
the polity actually faces.244 Citizen support for large-scale policy
245
initiatives may dry up. Worst of all, there is some risk that scandalmongering could actually shock the citizenry in ways that release
latent illiberality. A significant body of new research into the
psychodynamics of authoritarianism shows that loss of confidence in
government causes citizens who are predisposed to authoritarianism
to turn against others who embody difference, be they racial and
religious minorities, political dissidents, or moral deviants.246 Effective
political leadership and the appearance of consensus in group opinion
operate to suppress these authoritarian tendencies; leadership failures
and normative dissensus draw them out.247

242. See supra Part II.B.1.a.ii.
243. This is a recurring theme in the U.S. legal academic literature on the former
“independent counsel” statute, the Ethics in Government Act. See, e.g., Erin Daly, Review
Essay: What We Knew or Should Have Known About the Independent Counsel, 5 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 259 (2000) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF THE STATE: THE
INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999), and BOB
WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE (1999)).
244. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2275–80
(1998) (arguing that the (now former) Independent Counsel Act “diminishe[d] substantive
discussion of real questions, by focusing attention on imagined scandals or wrongdoing”).
245. That the loss of public trust in government undermines public support for
governmental problem-solving is an important new theme in public opinion scholarship. See
MARC HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS: DECLINING POLITICAL TRUST AND THE
DEMISE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (2006); Virginia A. Chanley et al., The Origins and
Consequences of Public Trust in Government, 64 PUB. OPINION Q. 239 (2000).
246. The research is recapped in KAREN STENNER, THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC
(2005).
247. See id.
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None of this goes to say that it is a bad thing for advisory
counterparts to possess coercive powers of investigation. Equipping a
counterpart with such powers may do much to enhance the
informational base of the body’s law-reform recommendations. But in
view of the risks, the delegation of coercive powers of investigation to
advisory counterparts will need to be carefully circumscribed and
checked, particularly where the body’s investigations may reach or
implicate elected officials.248
iii. The Exercise of Legislative Process Rights. A third tack for
empowering counterparts to “prompt, maintain, and focus” public
debate about basic societal commitments is to give these bodies a
limited, formal role in the legislative process—what I shall term a
“legislative process right.” A counterpart’s exercise of its legislative
process prerogative could have public discourse effects in virtue of
what the counterpart causes to happen as a formal matter, and, as
important, in virtue of what the counterpart’s action signals. I shall
take up each of these points in turn, and then offer a few comparative
remarks on constitutional courts and “legislative process”
counterparts as public-agenda setters.
Formal Roles. There are three extant models for counterpart
legislative process rights. First is the delay paradigm, exemplified by
the House of Lords’ suspensive veto.249 (Or consider the milder
possibility of a fixed period for counterpart comment on pending
250
legislation. ) The suspensive veto and other modalities of delay may
have discourse effects simply by increasing the amount of time and
rounds of voting that lawmakers must give over to the bill in question
before it can become law. The longer the bill remains the subject of
legislators’ attention, the more debate and discussion among the
wider public it and possible alternatives are likely to receive.
248. To some degree, the check may be provided by governmental immunities against being
called to account for actions taken in an official capacity. Cf. MARC VAN DER HULST, THE
PARLIAMENTARY MANDATE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 63–78 (2000) (offering a
comparative perspective on the legislative privilege); Steven F. Heufner, The Neglected Values
of the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 (2003) (discussing
the status of legislative privilege among the U.S. states).
249. See supra text accompanying note 110.
250. Cf. LÓPEZ-PINTOR, supra note 7, at 157 (noting the practice in Uruguay of election
commission hearings on pending electoral legislation); Simon Evans, Improving Human Rights
Analysis in the Legislative and Policy Process (Univ. of Melbourne Legal Studies, Research
Paper No. 124, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=771225 (proposing procedure
for human-rights analysis of pending legislation).
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The second paradigm, initiation, is exemplified by redistricting in
Iowa. Following each decennial census, the Iowa redistricting
authority draws up a proposed map of legislative districts, which it
251
forwards to the legislature. Lawmakers are free to vote down the
proposed map, but they may not take up a reapportionment bill of
their own creation until they have twice rejected, by closed-rule vote,
252
successive offerings from the redistricting authority.
Although a vote of the legislature hardly guarantees public
attention for a counterpart’s proposal, it should, at the margin at
253
least, boost that proposal’s political salience. It may also help
challengers make a campaign issue out of the incumbent’s stance on
counterpart recommendations, particularly if, as in Iowa, the
legislative vote takes place under a closed rule.254 And if the
incumbent’s vote does become a campaign issue, the counterpart will
have prevailed in its battle for public attention.

251. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.3 (West, Westlaw through Acts of 2006 Reg. Sess.).
252. Id.
253. The political science literature is divided on the extent to which votes of the legislature
register with (and affect) the voting public. A number of studies have found that roll call votes
in Congress do have consequences for public opinion and ballot-box outcomes—that someone
seems to be paying attention. See, e.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, SENATE
ELECTIONS (1982); Alan I. Abramowitz, Explaining Senate Election Outcomes, 82 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 385 (1988); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House
Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 136 (2001); Walter Dean Burnam, Insulation and Responsiveness
in Congressional Elections, 90 POL. SCI. Q. 411 (1975); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of
Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 127 (2002); John K. Dalager, Voters, Issues, and Elections: Are the Candidates’ Messages
Getting Through?, 58 J. POL. 486 (1996); Robert S. Erikson, The Electoral Impact of
Congressional Roll Call Voting, 65 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1018 (1971); Robert S. Erikson & Gerald
C. Wright, Representation of Constituency Ideology in Congress, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
IN HOUSE ELECTIONS 148 (David W. Brady et al. eds., 2000); John R. Johannes & John C.
McAdams, The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility, or
Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 512 (1981); George
Serra & David Moon, Casework, Issue Positions and Voting in Congressional Elections: A
District Analysis, 56 J. POL. 200 (1994); Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Candidates’ Policy Positions and
Voting in U.S. Congressional Elections, 3 LEGAL STUD. Q. 445 (1978). Other studies portray an
electorate that pays little attention to issues and candidates’ voting records in most elections.
For a survey of this literature, see HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 133, at 19–34, 150–56;
NICHOLSON, supra note 235, at 10–13. Various attempts have been made to reconcile the two
sets of findings. See generally VINCENT L. HUTCHINGS, PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRATIC
ACCOUNTABILITY: HOW CITIZENS LEARN ABOUT POLITICS 5–15 (2003) (reviewing theories
concerning electoral district homogeneity, collective intelligence through preference
aggregation, interest group activity, and the potential for activation of “latent” political
preferences).
254. This argument is elaborated in Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1382–85, 1418–21.
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The third paradigm, end-run, has the advisory body issuing
legislative proposals to citizens at large, who then vote on whether to
enact the proposal. Illustrative is the Florida Constitution Revision
Commission, convened once every twenty years to consider the need
255
for constitutional change. The Commission has authority to draft
reforms and put them to a vote of the people.256 Proposals that receive
257
a majority vote take effect as constitutional amendments.
As a general matter, one should expect more citizen engagement
and learning from a counterpart-triggered referendum than a
required vote of the legislature. Direct democracy has been shown to
enhance voter knowledge and rates of political participation; citizens
258
also come to feel a greater sense of political efficacy.
Signaling Priorities. The extent to which an advisory
counterpart’s exercise of its legislative process right catches and holds
public attention seems likely to depend, in large measure, on what
cues voters receive about the issue’s importance. Some votes of the
legislature receive scant public attention. Referendum questions may
not be all that different, at least in jurisdictions like California where
259
they have become quotidian. Ultimately, the counterpart’s ability to
“prompt, maintain, and focus” debate through the exercise of
legislative process rights may be closely connected to the issue of
persuasive authority: though the counterpart need not convince

255. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (2006). See generally Symposium, The 1997–98 Constitution
Revision Commission, 52 FLA. L. REV. 275 (2000).
256. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 5 (2006).
257. Id. § 5(e).
258. Regarding voter knowledge, see DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT,
EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2004); Matthew Mendelsohn & Fred
Cutler, The Effect of Referendums on Democratic Citizens: Information, Politicization, Efficacy
and Tolerance, 30 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 685 (2000); Mark A. Smith, Ballot Initiatives and the
Democratic Citizen, 64 J. POL. 892 (2002). Regarding participation, see Mark A. Smith, The
Contingent Effects of Ballot Initiatives and Candidate Races on Turnout, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 700
(2001); Caroline J. Tolbert et al., The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the
American States, 29 AM. POL. RES. 625 (2001). Regarding the sense of political efficacy, see
Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Democracy, Institutions, and Attitudes About Citizen Influence
on Government, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 371 (2002); Mendelsohn & Cutler, supra. Ballot initiative
campaigns can also have a large influence on voters’ sense of the relative importance of
different issues, even to the point of “setting the agenda” for seemingly unrelated campaigns for
elected office. See generally NICHOLSON, supra note 235 (setting forth and testing this
hypothesis).
259. See Stephen P. Nicholson, The Political Environment and Ballot Proposition
Awareness, 83 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1393 (2003) (reviewing California ballot propositions between
1956 and 2000).
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voters of the ultimate wisdom of its proposed remedy, it must be able
to persuade them that the problem it has identified really matters (or
at least deserves a serious second look).
This leads to a pair of questions. First, what counterpart
attributes would tend to make the body more persuasive (with the
median voter) as a priority setter? Second, is it plausible to think that
even a relatively persuasive counterpart’s claims about priorities
would be taken seriously by average voters in the teeth of elected
officials’ statements to the contrary?260
As to the first question, four attributes would seem key. The first
is breadth of jurisdiction. Other things equal, the larger the domain
over which the counterpart ranges in comparing issues and setting
priorities, the more likely it is that the counterpart’s judgment of
priorities will correspond to that of hypothetically omniscient voters.
The second is information. Voters are more likely to take seriously
the counterpart’s statement of priorities to the extent that they
261
believe it to be well informed. The third is ideology. The median
voter is more likely to credit a statement of priorities from a body she
regards as ideologically mainstream or first-order diverse.262 The
263
fourth attribute is a credible and easily understood signaling device.
To illustrate, imagine a counterpart authorized to make a
“determination of exceptional need,” perhaps by qualified majority,
which determination would qualify the body to exercise its legislative
process right while simultaneously precluding the body from
exercising that right again for at least x years, perhaps five or ten or
twenty.264 Under these conditions, the counterpart’s decision to call
260. Compare my earlier treatment of the problem of persuasive authority concerning
proposed reforms. See supra Part II.B.1.
261. Note that there may be a tradeoff between breadth of jurisdiction and information. The
broader the body’s jurisdiction, the less likely it is to have special expertise as to any given issue.
262. Here I follow the terminology introduced by Heather Gerken. See Heather K. Gerken,
Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1106–08 (2005) (distinguishing between firstorder and second-order diversity, defining the former as proportional representation of the
relevant variation within the citizenry on a public decisionmaking body, and the latter in terms
of “variation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them”).
Notice that a first-order diverse body—in contrast to a centrist body—might be
persuasive with voters well to the left and right of the median, assuming that members of the
body reach substantial consensus on a priority.
263. On credible communication and citizen learning, see LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note
173.
264. Another, more fanciful possibility is to set up the counterpart with a dedicated funding
source and authority to run advertising campaigns. The body would then have the option of
hoarding its resources in anticipation of rare “big bang” campaigns on issues it deems truly
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into play the special legislative procedure would communicate that of
all the manifold issues with which it is concerned, this one, right now
265
is the most important it expects to encounter for at least x years.
This model is, admittedly, pretty far removed from most extant
counterparts, and even from advocates’ proposals for the creation of
one or another such body.266 As noted earlier, specialist advisory
bodies predominate.267 Proposals abound for new privacy
commissions,268
information
commissions,269
anticorruption
270
271
human rights commissions,
and electoral
commissions,
commissions.272 But one rarely sees proposals for merging existing
bodies or creating new advisory bodies whose jurisdiction would span
273
Also, proponents of human rights
these various domains.
commissions, privacy commissions, and the like typically seek to
populate such bodies with advocates for the proponents’ special

momentous. Cf. id. at 209–210 (explaining how an actor’s expenditure of resources on ballot
campaigns credibly signals how much it cares about the ballot question). Of course, the signal
would be weaker insofar as the funds expended were restricted in the uses to which they could
be put.
265. Or, at least, the most important as to which a solution/improvement is politically
feasible or potentially so.
266. Note, though, that the concept of remedying constitutional problems through a special
legislative procedure also has a precedent in the U.K. Human Rights Act, see David Fontana,
Secondary Judicial Review (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law
Journal), though the Human Rights Act does not afford a privileged position to any
independent advisory body.
267. Though in the law commissions and perhaps in some human rights commissions there
are precursors for a counterpart whose jurisdiction would be co-extensive with the society’s
basic commitments, somehow defined. See supra Part I.F.
268. E.g., Gellman, supra note 37.
269. E.g., Vaughn, supra note 53.
270. E.g., Petter Langseth et al., The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting
Corruption (Econ. Dev. Inst. of the World Bank, Working Paper, 1997), available at
http://www.respondanet.com/english/anti_corruption/publications/documents/nis_e.pdf;
cf.
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT 161 (1999) (“Independent
anticorruption agencies are a popular reform proposal in developing countries.”).
271. E.g., INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 1 (“These days every
country has to have a national human rights commission.”); UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (1995) (setting forth
recommendations for NHRIs); C. Raj Kumar, Developing a Human Rights Culture in Hong
Kong: Creating a Framework for Establishing an Independent Human Rights Commission, 11
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 407 (2004) (proposing human rights commission for Hong Kong).
272. E.g., Elmendorf, supra note 62.
273. One exception is that in South Africa, the proliferation of independent bodies
concerned with different aspects of human rights has led some to call for partial consolidation
under the umbrella of the national human rights commission. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 7, at 306–07.
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concerns, rather than to compose centrist or first-order diverse
274
institutions. Finally, I am not aware of any extant counterpart with a
legislative process right designed as I suggest.275 So what I envision
here as a counterpart designed for constitutional priority setting is
really no more than a thought experiment.
That said, is it plausible to think that such a counterpart’s
determinations of need could move sidelined issues to the center of
public attention and debate? Would the issue that the counterpart
flags still be worth a second look for voters whose electorally
accountable representative flatly rejects the counterpart’s judgment
of priorities? An affirmative answer is plausible. For one, if the
counterpart’s determination debars it from exercising the legislative
process right for a number of years, the counterpart’s assertion is not
just “cheap talk.” It is a step to be taken with great care. By contrast,
the legislator who simply waves off the counterpart’s statement of
priorities puts nothing on the line. (Unless she mounts an expensive
advertising campaign to defeat the counterpart’s recommendation—
in which case, the counterpart has already scored a victory in the
battle for public attention.) Second, legislators are pushed and pulled
by all sorts of day-to-day pressures: meeting with constituents, raising
money, dealing with the umpteen bills circulating through the
legislature or in the offing, searching out media opportunities, and
more.
The
legislator’s
institutional
position
encourages
responsiveness to her constituents’ demands, but does not conduce to

274. See, e.g., FLAHERTY, supra note 39, at 390–91 (arguing that the job of a privacy
commission is simply to articulate concerns that a legislature might give short shrift, rather than
to strike a balance among competing considerations); Kumar, supra note 26, at 294 (arguing that
NHRIs are needed because “the judiciary is concerned with all disputes in society and may not
have sufficient time and resources to focus exclusively on human rights issues”); cf. MANION,
supra note 57, at 201 (“Policy analysts tout . . . . the exclusive anticorruption mission of the
[Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption]: The ICAC is not embedded in the
civil service or any larger organization with multiple goals.”). The influential Paris Principles for
NHRIs instruct:
The composition of the [NHRI] and the appointment of its members . . . shall be
established in accordance with a procedure which affords all necessary guarantees to
ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian society) involved in
the protection and promotion of human rights . . . .
Paris Principles, supra note 26, § 1 (emphasis added). A degree of diversity is welcome, but not
if that means the appointment of commissioners who think that human rights proponents
generally suffer tunnel vision and undersell competing values.
275. Compare Iowa redistricting and Florida constitution revision, where the special
legislative procedure has been routinized, recurring automatically once every ten years in Iowa
and twenty years in Florida, and as such conveys little information about priorities.
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sustained study and big-picture reflection on priorities. The
counterpart’s remove from the day-to-day struggles of politics may
put it in a better position to identify important issues that for one
reason or another have remained peripheral to the course of political
debate—especially if the importance of the issue is only manifest to
observers whose time horizon extends well beyond the next election.
b. Constitutional Courts and Priority-Setting Counterparts
Compared. There is some basis for thinking that priority-setting
counterparts (with suitably circumscribed legislative process rights)
would compare favorably to constitutional courts (with authority to
enjoin duly enacted laws) as institutions for prompting, maintaining,
and focusing public debate about the meaning and application of the
polity’s nominally constitutive commitments. Before proceeding with
the argument, let me emphasize the limited and tentative nature of
the claims I shall advance. My ambition is, first, to illustrate how one
might go about comparing different ways of institutionalizing a
commitment to constitutional dialogue, and, second, to advance a few
preliminary conjectures about how the debate attendant to a prioritysetting counterpart’s determination of need is likely to differ, in
normatively relevant ways, from the debate that follows a
constitutional court’s striking down of high-profile laws. My argument
certainly does not prove anything. It will have served its purpose if it
provokes further thought about how dialogic institutions should be
assessed—and about the merits and demerits of different ways of
designing advisory counterparts and involving them in the legislative
process.
The following considerations are, I think, germane to the
normative inquiry, and I will pursue the comparison of courts and
counterparts in these terms: (1) whether the issues that get served up
for debate are important or trivial; (2) whether the debate-forcing
activity is costly; and (3) the character and consequences of the
debate itself.
i. Issue Selection. Because citizens’ energy and enthusiasm for
thinking about public matters is limited, a counterpart’s (or a
constitutional court’s) foisting of a previously peripheral issue into
the center of public debate will inevitably displace public and
legislative attention from other matters. It may be argued, then, that
one measure of a “good” mechanism for inducing public debate about
constitutional questions is whether the issues that end up getting aired
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are issues that would, upon considered and informed reflection, be
deemed truly important by a majority of the citizenry.
Constitutional litigation represents a fairly haphazard way of
“selecting” constitutional issues for public debate. In the United
States, the Supreme Court decisions that register on the public
agenda are generally marked by two qualities: (1) they concern
“highly affective” topics (e.g., flag burning, school prayer, school
desegregation, capital punishment, abortion, the use of eminent
276
domain against owner-occupied homes), and (2) they antagonize
well-organized interest groups or the citizenry at large.277 The Justices
may well make an implicit determination about priorities before they
take the risky step of striking down a law that has substantial popular
or interest-group support, yet the Court is not well equipped to
function as a priority setter. It lacks the requisite breadth of
perspective, resources for legislative fact-finding, and exposure to the
concerns of citizens.278
There is, of course, no guarantee that a priority-setting
counterpart’s judgment about priorities would correspond to the
considered views of a hypothetically well-informed citizenry. But at
least the counterpart, unlike the constitutional court, would be both
well positioned to make priority determinations (because of its factfinding resources), and structurally encouraged to do so (because of
the temporal limitation on its legislative process right). And if I am
right that the counterpart’s determination of priorities would itself
garner public attention, the range of issues that the counterpart might
move onto the public agenda should prove considerably broader than
the range of issues to which the courts attract attention. Important
but less affectively salient issues concerning, for example, the
structure of representation and government accountability, may lie
within the counterpart’s reach.

276. Flemming et al., One Voice Among Many, supra note 227, at 1247; see also supra notes
227–28 and accompanying text.
277. Cf. Flemming et al., One Voice Among Many, supra note 227, at 1243–46 (contrasting
the meager public-agenda impact of the “accommodationist” church/state decision in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), with the large and enduring impact of the “separationist”
church/state decisions in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948),
and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)).
278. Yet to some degree the Court may gauge an issue’s importance based on the number of
amicus briefs filed by interest groups. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized
Interest and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988).
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ii. The Cost of the Debate-Forcing Activity. Debate-forcing
comes at a price. Beyond the opportunity cost of displacing other
issues from the public agenda, there are costs that the independent
body may incur or impose in the very act of putting questions on the
agenda. These costs may be financial (e.g., if the issue is moved onto
the agenda with an advertising campaign), or democratic (e.g., if the
issue is moved onto the agenda by striking down laws whose
constitutionality is subject to reasonable disagreement).279 The
priority-setting counterpart is normatively attractive in that the
body’s debate-forcing technique does not incur the democratic costs
of judicial invalidation.280 Nor does it require the counterpart to make
large financial outlays; the body should be able to credibly convey its
judgment about priorities by invoking its legislative process right,
without more.
iii. The Character and Consequences of the Debate. The trickiest
questions—positive and normative alike—presented by any project of
institutional reform on behalf of dialogic constitutionalism pertain to
the character and consequences of the debate itself. What
differentiates “good” from “bad” public discourse about
constitutional questions is not altogether straightforward, nor is it
easy to predict the dialogic consequences of replacing one
independent institution with another or adding a new institution to
the existing mix.
As a way to get started, I would suggest the following normative
criteria:
• Learning. Debate that results in citizens assimilating new
information and revising their views accordingly is preferable
to debate in which the participants merely vent and the
onlookers cheer and jeer.
• Heart of the Matter. Debate that hones in on the meaning
and application of the nominally constitutive commitment is
preferable to debate that skirts the big issues.

279. There will also be financial costs to the debate itself, as interest groups and others join
the fray. But it is not clear that these costs depend in any systematic way upon the “trigger
mechanism” for getting the debate started.
280. One might discount these “democratic” costs in the case of judicial invalidations of laws
whose unconstitutionality is beyond doubt. But if there is not a reasonable basis for disagreeing
with the court’s determination, it is unlikely that the determination would induce much debate.
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Political Efficacy. Debate that leaves citizens feeling that
they can understand politics and participate effectively is
preferable to debate that gives rise to a sense of political
alienation.
Tolerance and Mutual Respect. Debate that fosters tolerance
and mutual respect among citizens with disparate worldviews
is preferable to debate that ratchets up feelings of animus or
disgust.
Policy Support. Debate that results in enhanced citizen
support for “good” policy reforms—insofar as there exists an
objective, ascertainable metric for what is good policy—is
preferable to debate that does not.

Bracketing for now the last of these criteria (I certainly do not
claim privileged knowledge of the requisite metric), I would submit
that a priority-setting counterpart may well fare better than a
constitutional court along the first four dimensions. Consider how the
court- and counterpart-triggered debates might differ on account of
(1) differences in constitutional context; (2) the existence (or lack
thereof) of areas of public agreement concerning the problem at
hand; and (3) the legibility of what the independent actor offers up
for discussion. First off, let’s be clear about these underlying
distinctions.
Constitutional context. Assuming that norms of legality have
been established and that the constitution is entrenched, the court’s
decision will not be reversible through the ordinary legislative
process. The public response to the issue served up by the court is a
response to a policy settlement that is difficult to override. By
contrast, the public response to the advisory counterpart’s
determination of need would be a reaction to a pending decision, still
up for negotiation, which will be made (if at all) by the people or their
elected representatives and which may later be reversed in the same
way as any other legislative enactment.
Areas of agreement. Insofar as the counterpart succeeds in
rallying public attention to the problem at hand, this will probably be
due, in large measure, to the fact that the electorate is initially
persuaded by the counterpart’s judgment about constitutional
priorities. Also, the counterpart is unlikely to waste its rare legislative
process right on problems for which there is no reasonable prospect
of forging a politically saleable remedy. By contrast, judicial holdings
of unconstitutionality need not be predicated on any broad

01__ELMENDORF.DOC

1024

3/9/2007 7:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:953

agreement concerning the importance of the issue or the viability of
political compromise.
Legibility of the offering. Courts present conclusions about how
the constitution applies to the facts of the case at hand, along with an
explanation—typically obscure to the nonspecialist—cast in terms of
281
legal doctrine and precedent. The priority-setting counterpart, by
contrast, offers an account of why the problem at hand matters—why
it deserves the public’s attention—and some ideas about how the
problem might be remedied. Because the counterpart’s claim to
authority, if any, is persuasive rather than legal, the body’s offering is
more likely to be framed in terms that are intelligible to average
citizens, and more likely to be developed through a process of public
consultation.282
The upshot. The debate following the counterpart’s intervention
should ultimately have a very different flavor and focus than the
debate that ensues in the wake of prominent constitutional court
283
decisions. High-profile Supreme Court decisions are polarizing.
Think of abortion, the death penalty, and the like. Social scientists
have argued that public opinion polarizes because political
contestation in the wake of the Court’s decisions helps previously
inattentive citizens to align their policy preferences with their
underlying normative intuitions.284 I suspect, however, that the Court’s
high-profile interventions have also been polarizing because they are
uniquely threatening to supporters of the laws struck down.
Individual decisions are difficult for opponents to get reversed, and
possess a generative potential for “worse” decisions down the line.
The likely course of a new line of jurisprudence is hard to foretell,

281. Cf. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION (1992) (lamenting that the
U.S. Supreme Court has failed to justify its holdings in terms that are intelligible to the citizenry
at large); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1381 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . tend to be distracted in their arguments about rights by side
arguments about how a text like the Bill of Rights is best approached by judges.” (emphasis
added)).
282. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
283. See, e.g., Brickman & Peterson, supra note 227 (regarding abortion); Franklin &
Kosaki, supra note 227 (same); Johnson & Martin, supra note 227 (regarding abortion and
capital punishment); Vincent Price & Anca Romantan, Confidence in Institutions Before,
During and After “Indecision 2000,” 66 J. POL. 939 (2004) (regarding Bush v. Gore); cf. Michael
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HISTORY 81
(1994) (regarding “backlash” to Supreme Court desegregation decisions).
284. Variations on this argument are developed in Brickman & Peterson, supra note 227,
and Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 227.
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and the case-or-controversy norm discourages judicial conversations
with the elected branches of government (or citizens, or interest
groups) about cases yet to come, conversations that might alleviate
some of the opponents’ worst fears.
A counterpart’s statement about the constitutional values at
stake in a particular problem—think here of the determination of
exceptional need—should not be nearly so threatening. The
statement does not portend anything more disruptive than, for
example, the introduction of counterpart-drafted legislation, or a
referendum ballot, or a suspensive veto. The statement really does
operate as an invitation to a conversation, rather than as a demand to
speak up on pain of suffering through a string of adverse
constitutional rulings. Also, the processes by which the counterpart
develops its proposed remedy—public hearings, focus groups,
consultations with interest groups and politicians, and the like—
facilitate the consideration of alternatives and can accommodate
compromise. And, as noted above, the counterpart is unlikely to
expend its legislative process right on issues as to which there’s little
hope of forging a compromise that could win majority support in a
vote of the legislature or of the citizenry.
On balance, the counterpart’s intervention is likely to foster a
rather pragmatic, solution-oriented debate about the problem that
has been identified. The image of a pragmatic, solution-oriented
debate in which possibilities for compromise stand out may be
contrasted with the kind of debate that attends high-profile judicial
determinations of unconstitutionality. The contestants in Courtunleashed debates focus mainly on vivifying the stakes, questioning or
bolstering the legitimacy of the Court’s intervention, and trying to
locate some viable doctrinal basis on which to design and defend a
replacement for the law struck down.285 The main object is to move
the Court, and the politicians who appoint Justices to the Court, not
to figure out how best to remedy the problem the Court purports to
have identified.

285. Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 157, at 58–60 (explaining how a Supreme Court flag-burning
decision, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), engendered “distort[ed]” legislative response,
in which the question that mattered—“whether the flag’s symbolic value is so great that we
should protect it even at some cost to the protection of free expression”—was never squarely
faced because the Court had removed it from the menu of permissible bases on which to found
the regulation of flag-burning).
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How does all this fit with the normative criteria outlined above?
Very quickly (and speculatively):
Learning. A debate in which neither side is relegated to fighting
against a constitutionally entrenched policy, and which admits of
compromise, seems more likely to foster open-mindedness on the
part of the participants and their audience.
Heart of the Matter. As Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron have
argued, constitutional dialogue free of “judicial overhang”—and
therefore free of institutional concerns specific to the electorally
unaccountable,
precedent-oriented,
and
informationally
impoverished judiciary—is much more likely than court-oriented
discourse to air the issues of political morality and shared obligation
286
that the idea of a constitutive political commitment evokes. To be
sure, one might object that politically prudent counterparts will try to
avoid fomenting debate over the most contentious of questions,
whereas the same tendency among constitutional courts is now and
then happily overcome thanks to ideological litigants or the courts’
political obtuseness. Whether public institutions should be designed
to encourage the airing of the citizenry’s most intractable values
disagreements is, however, open to doubt. Political discourse that gets
at the heart of those matters may be harmful to social tolerance and
mutual respect.287
Political Efficacy. A constitutional dialogue in which citizens are
called to participate by a visibly responsive institution (as by a
counterpart seeking democratic credentials for its recommendation)
should contribute to the development of citizens’ sense of “external”
political efficacy.288 Efficacy will be further enhanced if the decision to
enact or reject the counterpart’s recommendation turns on a
289
referendum vote. By contrast, constitutional court decisions that

286. TUSHNET, supra note 157, at 57–65; Waldron, supra note 281, at 1384–85.
287. See infra note 291 and accompanying text.
288. Political scientists define “internal efficacy” as the citizen’s sense of her ability to
comprehend politics and governmental institutions, and “external efficacy” as the citizen’s sense
of whether governmental institutions are responsive to the respondent and others similarly
situated. See, e.g., STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 15 (1993) (explaining these concepts).
289. On the linkage between direct democracy and efficacy, see Bowler & Donovan, supra
note 258, and Mendelsohn & Cutler, supra note 258.

01__ELMENDORF.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:44 AM

ADVISORY COUNTERPARTS

1027

reallocate policy questions from the legislative to the judicial arena
290
are likely to undermine citizens’ sense of external efficacy.
Social Tolerance and Mutual Respect. The relationships between
constitutional discourse, social tolerance, and mutual respect are
undoubtedly complex, perhaps too complex for this criterion to be
useful as a normative referent. However, there is a significant body of
evidence which suggests that tolerance for difference is enabled by
public confidence in the institutions of government, and, ironically, by
the papering over of deep values disagreements among different
291
groups of citizens. With these precepts in mind, one might suppose
that constitutional discourses are more likely to be toleranceenhancing insofar as they culminate in policy decisions that
ideologically disparate factions can support on the basis of
“incompletely theorized agreements”292—and that actually get
implemented (such that government looks like it works).
Constitutional dialogues predicated on determinations of need that
command widespread assent, and aimed at shaping a compromise
legislative response, offer the prospect of some such denouement.
3. Engaging the Citizenry: Conclusions. This Section has
explored how advisory counterparts may engage public opinion in
pursuit of legal reforms. Though the counterparts lack the
constitutional court’s legal authority to negate duly enacted law, they
are, in certain respects, better positioned to develop persuasive
authority with the electorate, such that voters revise their policy
preferences in line with the counterparts’ prescriptions. The evidence
to date is only anecdotal, but it appears that elected officials
sometimes face ballot-box sanctions for rejecting counterpartproposed election law and anticorruption reforms, particularly in the
aftermath of scandals. This dynamic arguably reflects both the
counterpart’s exercise of persuasive authority with the electorate
concerning the merits of the reform in question, and voters’ suspicion
that legislators whose oppose the reform have done so out of self
interest.
290. There is, however, the exception of constitutional rulings designed to increase
opportunities for political participation.
291. See generally STENNER, supra note 246 (developing and testing theories of what causes
intolerance and its expression as, for example, racism, punitiveness, and/or political and moral
hostility to difference).
292. For elaboration of the concept, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
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Beyond the election law and anticorruption domains, it is
doubtful that counterparts exercise much persuasive authority
concerning their preferred reforms. Counterparts that are not
persuasive in this way may nonetheless play an important role in
moving new issues to the center of public debate. Depending on the
counterpart in question, this might be achieved through public
education and advertising campaigns; through the carrying out of
high-profile investigations into governmental malfeasance and coverups; or through the exercise of a legislative process right, such as
authority to delay enactment of pending legislation or to put a
proposed reform to a vote of the legislature or the citizenry. A
counterpart’s effort to get a vigorous debate underway is more likely
to succeed insofar as (1) the issue chosen for debate emerges from a
priority setting process; (2) the counterpart has broad subject-matter
jurisdiction and a membership that is ideologically centrist or
representatively diverse; and (3) the counterpart has a credible and
easily understood device with which to signal its determination of
priorities, such as a legislative process right that may be exercised no
more frequently than once every x years.
The public discourse attendant to such a counterpart’s exercise
of its legislative process right is likely to have a rather different flavor
and focus than the debate following high-profile judicial holdings of
unconstitutionality. There is some basis for thinking that
constitutional dialogues engendered by priority-setting counterparts
would be normatively preferable to the debates occasionally
unleashed by constitutional courts, but this claim is quite tentative.293
C. The Puzzle of Independence
At the outset of this Part, I suggested that one of the attractions
of the “advisory counterpart method” for giving life to basic liberal

293. Indeed, one might argue that counterparts should be set up not to foster debate in
which deep values disagreements are bracketed, as I have suggested, but rather to induce
popular majorities occasionally to confront problems and proposed solutions as defined by
minorities—whether or not there is a reasonable prospect of compromise or accommodation.
Cf. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990) (developing a
normative account of a just society centered on citizens’ respect for and appreciation of group
differences); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005)
(defending forms of political organization that enable political minorities to make certain
decisions on behalf of the citizenry as a whole, on the theory that “dissenting by deciding” can
“generate a productive conversational dynamic between dissenters and the majority, between
the periphery and the center”).
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commitments is that an advisory body may be more thoroughly
insulated from the elected branches of government without risking
the creation of an anti-democratic monster. Any democracy that
delegates to its constitutional court the power to negate statutes and
enter remedial orders binding on the government will also ensure that
the elected branches of government have an array of tools for
294
checking the court’s power. Familiar examples include the power of
the purse, impeachment, and jurisdiction stripping.295 Constitutional
courts do their work in the shadow of a power of retaliation that
inheres in the elected branches.
As Barry Friedman, Mark Tushnet, and others have pointed out,
the twin narratives that frame generations of debate about
constitutional judicial review—one of countermajoritarian hope, the
other of countermajoritarian threat—both badly misrepresent the
296
actual practice of judicial review (in the United States, at least). The
Supreme Court has rarely fought the combined will of the president
and Congress. This is not surprising in view of the forms of control
that the elected branches retain over the Court. These controls are
entirely appropriate given the Constitution’s high hurdle for reversing
a Supreme Court holding of unconstitutionality.
If, however, the prospect of top-down illiberality provides the
most compelling reason for establishing independent bodies to tend
to basic liberal commitments, then perhaps the risk of overreach
would be better addressed by making the body’s power more directly
dependent on public opinion—e.g., by relegating the body to an
advisory role, perhaps with limited powers of legislative initiation or

294. Cf. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 972 (2002) (cataloguing political checks
on the power of the Article III judiciary).
295. Id.
296. TUSHNET, supra note 157, at 129–53 (offering an historical perspective on judicial
review in the United States); MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 33–112
(2004) (assessing the Rehnquist Court and future possibilities); Friedman, supra note 205, at
1267–82 (discussing insights from political science); see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957)
(evaluating the relationship between judicial decisionmaking and political ethos); Neal Devins,
The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Summer 2004) (examining
the social and political forces that impacted Rehnquist Court decisionmaking).
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delay—rather than by giving the elected branches a large measure of
297
control over the body.
But there is a catch. Effective independence depends on more
than de jure protections, and some of the political dynamics that
support the de facto independence of constitutional courts may not
work similarly for advisory bodies. This Section sketches an account
of the problem of de facto independence for advisory counterparts,
framing a number of questions for future research.
The existing counterparts are muffled with disappointing
regularity. Some human rights commissions have one shining
moment, after which the government responds with budget cuts,
personnel replacements, and the like.298 When the heat is on, human
rights commissions frequently emphasize education or conciliation, in
299
Anticorruption
lieu of the investigation of serious abuses.
commissions have overemphasized the prosecution of bureaucrats, at
the expense of structural reforms that would reduce incentives and
opportunities for corruption.300
Quiescence is not simply an emerging-democracy phenomenon.
Anticorruption commissions in New South Wales and Queensland,
Australia, both suffered severe retaliation after challenging
legislators’ abuse of travel privileges, and have since avoided
301
controversy. Some observers complain that the Australian Electoral
Commission has “settled for a condition of peaceful coexistence” with
elected lawmakers, rather than pestering them to adopt loopholeclosing measures the Commission has suggested.302 In the United
Kingdom, it was opposition leaders and a daring judge who blasted

297. In previous work, I have described a range of formal techniques by which independent
advisory bodies might be made exceptionally independent from the elected branches of
government. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1405–14.
298. This is a recurring theme in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7. See also Cardenas,
supra note 169, at 69 (noting that “national governments have curtailed the power of [all three
NHRIs the author studied], albeit to varying degrees”).
299. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 5 (discussing human rights commissions in
Africa); INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra note 7, at 50–51 (noting that the
Mexican Human Rights Commission has shied from investigating human rights abuses in the
military in favor of providing human-rights education).
300. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 270, at 162. Regarding the importance of structural
reforms in dealing with corruption, see id. at 227–28.
301. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1392 & nn. 111–118.
302. BARRY HINDESS, DEMOCRATIC AUDIT OF AUSTL., REPORT NO. 3, CORRUPTION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AUSTRALIA 18 (2004), available at http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/papers/
focussed_audits/200408_hindess_corruption.pdf.

01__ELMENDORF.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:44 AM

ADVISORY COUNTERPARTS

1031

the Government for its failure to adopt the Electoral Commission’s
303
ballot security reforms, not the Commission itself.
There are several respects in which the de facto independence of
specialist investigatory and advisory bodies seems likely to be more
precarious than that of a constitutional court with the same de jure
independence protections.
First, the effectiveness of investigative/advisory bodies may be
more budget-sensitive. Advisory counterparts need substantial
financial resources for conducting investigations, for sponsoring
research, for traveling and holding public hearings, for publishing
reports and pamphlets, for advertising their existence and
achievements, etc., all in the service of building a base of support for
their recommendations. They cannot make law simply by deciding
cases and entering remedial orders, like a constitutional court.
Second, the de facto independence of constitutional courts is
often attributed to the fact that these courts can be useful as well as
threatening to the elected branches, and it’s not clear that
counterparts can be useful in the same ways. Matthew Stephenson
theorizes that courts help to sustain informal pacts between the major
political parties, whereby the parties agree not to govern too far from
the center or to lock out the party that at a given moment is out of
304
power. Stephenson’s theory finds support in his 80-country dataset,
and maps nicely onto Alec Stone Sweet’s discursive account of the
ascendance of constitutional judicial review in Western Europe.305
Marc Graber argues that constitutional courts can help otherwise
fractious governing coalitions hold together by reducing the
dimensionality of ordinary politics.306 Roe v. Wade, he suggests,
enabled low-tax libertarians to cohabit with social conservatives in

303. Perhaps it is significant, though, that none of these bodies has been formally
entrenched by a written constitution.
304. Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003).
305. SWEET, supra note 125, at 73–79, 139–52 (2000) (explaining how minority legislative
factions strategically refer statutes to constitutional court, and how the court then “splits the
difference” between contending factions so as to build legitimacy); see also Jodi Finkel, Judicial
Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: How Electoral Incentives Shape Institutional Change, 39
LATIN AM. RES. REV. 56 (2004) (arguing that ruling parties seek to establish independent
judicial review as an “insurance policy” when their hold on power becomes tenuous); Jodi
Finkel, Judicial Reform as Insurance Policy: Mexico in the 1990s, 46 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y
87 (2004) (same).
306. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,
7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993).
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307
the Republican Party. With abortion effectively off the table,
libertarians were willing to stomach the symbolic social conservatism
of Republican lawmakers—a small price to pay for lower taxes. Keith
Whittington suggests that in political systems with multiple veto
points (characteristic of federal and separated-powers regimes),
constitutional courts can win political support over time by
“interposing a friendly hand,” helping national coalitions to overcome
regional obstructionism and entrenched interests, as well as
fractiousness within the coalition.308
Whether specialist advisory counterparts can fulfill these
functions seems doubtful. Lacking the constitutional court’s power of
negation, they cannot undertake old-statute demolition on behalf of
current legislative majorities, or strategically remove coalitionsplitting issues from the domain of ordinary politics. Restricted by
their narrow subject-matter jurisdiction, they cannot roam across the
range of issues that are germane to informal pacts among competing
political parties.
Moreover, the advisory counterparts stand to threaten the
electoral fortunes of incumbent lawmakers. A body that is authorized
to hold public hearings and develop statutory proposals in
consultation with the citizenry may encroach on legislators’ control
over the policymaking agenda. It may effectively force legislators to
address questions they would prefer to avoid, exposing lawmakers to
political risk. By contrast, a constitutional court’s overruling of the
legislator’s pet enactment often creates political opportunity. The
legislator can make hay by criticizing the court’s decision and
pledging her support for a different kind of judge come the next
round of appointments.309
None of this means that quiescence is the inexorable fate of the
advisory counterparts. But students of these bodies ought to be
attentive to the problem of de facto independence, and to study the
design choices that bear on this critically important attribute. In
addition to assessing such important formalities as (1) appointment
and removal procedures; (2) conflict-of-interest rules; and (3)

307. Id. at 53–60.
308. Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583
(2005).
309. Cf. SWEET, supra note 125, at 77 (mentioning legislators’ use of constitutional courts as
scapegoats).
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310
mechanisms for guarding budgets; one should pay attention to how
the design of an advisory counterpart affects the likelihood (4) that it
will develop a base of support within the electorate that discourages
311
assaults on its independence; and (5) that elected-branch officials
will come to see the body as politically useful in some respects, even if
threatening in others.
In particular, I would urge close attention to several issues which
on the surface might not appear germane to independence: breadth of
subject-matter jurisdiction; constitutional entrenchment of nonadvisory responsibilities in the counterpart; and constitutional
limitations on the legislature’s authority to delegate further
responsibilities—especially non-advisory ones—to the counterpart.
As to the breadth-of-jurisdiction issue, there is some basis for
thinking that de facto independence will be less of a problem for
generalist than specialist advisory bodies. A broad-jurisdiction body
should have a wider range of constituencies to fall back on in the
event that its independence is threatened. One might also anticipate
that broad jurisdiction would, over time, help the counterpart to
achieve a higher public profile,312 such that attacks on its
independence are more likely to register with the citizenry. Finally, a
body with broad jurisdiction should be better positioned to palliate

310. Appointments procedures, conflict-of-interest rules, and mechanisms for guarding
budgets are treated in Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 1405–14. That article concerns advisory
electoral commissions, but the “design guidelines” adduced therein would seem more generally
applicable.
311. Note that the base of citizen support needed to sustain de facto independence differs in
key respects from the base of support needed to get counterpart-proposed policies adopted. For
citizen support to sustain a counterpart’s independence, citizen support must be (1) ongoing (as
opposed to arising now and then at opportune moments, such as in the wake of scandals, or at
the time of the counterpart’s exercise of a legislative process right); and (2) comprehending of
how various legal reforms or budgetary decisions would affect the counterpart’s independence.
That these conditions can be difficult to satisfy is suggested by the saga of the anticorruption
commissions in New South Wales and Queensland, Australia, which despite apparently broad
popular support suffered severe retaliation in the wake of their conflicts with parliament over
parliamentary travel voucher administration and legislative ethics. See Elmendorf, supra note
62, at 1391–92 & nn. 102–118.
312. Broad jurisdiction may help the counterpart achieve a higher public profile for two
reasons. First, the broader the advisory body’s jurisdiction, the more likely it is to reach
whatever happens to be the political “issue of the day,” and hence newsworthy. Over the long
run, then, the broad-jurisdiction advisory body is likely to enjoy more media attention than any
given specialist body. Second, the combination of interestingly varied subject matter and
newsworthiness is likely to make the broad-jurisdiction counterpart a more attractive perch for
many persons of significant public renown, and the appointment of luminaries to serve on the
body is one way of boosting public awareness about the body itself.
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the powers that be. It has more room to soften the impact of its more
threatening proposals (e.g., redistricting reform) by recommending
friendly measures on other fronts (e.g., a bill to raise lawmakers’
salaries so as to make them harder to bribe). Yet the literature on law
revision commissions—whose jurisdiction is not subject-limited at
all—suggests that these bodies have often struggled to build popular
313
support. The same goes for second legislative chambers whose
members were not popularly elected.314 Broader jurisdiction, then,
does not necessarily equate to stronger de facto independence. To
generate popular support for counterpart independence, then, it may
be necessary to define the body’s responsibilities in terms of issues as
to which the ordinary political process is thought prone to failure. The
rationale for independence should be transparent to average citizens.
Turn now to the constitutional entrenchment of nonadvisory
responsibilities in the counterpart. The universe of governmental
functions and powers that might plausibly be assigned to a politically
insulated body is large, including, for example, authority to audit
public accounts, to initiate and carry out investigations of high-level
malfeasance, to prosecute corruption, to exercise what I have termed
“legislative process rights” in relation to the body’s law reform
recommendations, to administer and regulate elections, to direct a
central bank, or even to perform constitutional judicial review.
Within the confines of this introductory Article I cannot hope to
say much about the optimal combination of advisory and nonadvisory responsibilities as a constitutional matter. The answer is
likely to vary from one polity to the next. Suffice it for now to point
out some of the interesting questions that merit further study. The
constitutional combination of advisory and non-advisory functions
within the same independent body might serve the goal of
independence by raising the public profile of the nominally
315
independent body; by giving citizens who discount the body’s law316
reform role other reasons to defend the body’s independence; by
giving legislators an affirmative reason to support the body’s

313. See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 105–12 and accompanying text.
315. Recall that Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption made a big
splash early on with its investigations into police syndicates. See supra note 239.
316. Perhaps the value of independent election administration or anticorruption
enforcement is, for example, more tangible to many citizens than the value of an independent,
constitutionally inflected voice for law reform.

01__ELMENDORF.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:44 AM

ADVISORY COUNTERPARTS

1035

317
independence; or by equipping the independent body with tools
with which it may credibly threaten elected officials who might
otherwise encroach on the body’s independence.318
On the other hand, to the extent that the counterpart has
significant non-advisory powers, the normative case for exceptional
political insulation would seem more tenuous. This is especially true if
the body’s nonadvisory powers include coercive authority to
investigate high level malfeasance, given that advisory counterparts
can have an institutional interest in discrediting the elected branches
of government.319 Note also that administrative or regulatory powers
with which the counterpart could threaten particular elected
officials—think here, in particular, of authority to administer
elections, or to investigate alleged corruption—might be employed
not simply to secure the body’s independence, but also to advance its
law reform agenda without recourse to public opinion.320 Such powers
might also make the counterpart a more attractive target for wouldbe partisan capturers of the institution.
The de facto independence of a constitutionally entrenched
advisory counterpart may be affected not only by whether the
constitution delegates non-advisory responsibilities to the
counterpart, but also by whether it authorizes the legislature to do so.
Elected lawmakers sometimes seek to avoid political controversy by
delegating contentious questions to government agencies, or to the
courts. Occasionally it is helpful to delegate the matter at hand to an
agency with a public reputation for being non-political. Consider the

317. For example, electoral competition and oscillation in party control of government may
create incentives for the delegation of election administration to independent agencies. See
Elmendorf, supra note 210, at 431.
318. For example, coercive powers of investigation that may be deployed against thenserving elected officials or their aides or supporters. (To be sure, it is not altogether clear
whether de jure authority to exercise such powers will tend to make the counterpart more or
less independent over time. While it could discourage some assaults on the body’s
independence, it might also make legislators more eager to hamstring the body when doing so
looks politically feasible.)
319. See supra Part II.B.2.a.ii. (discussing costs of “scandal mongering”).
320. The leverage that electoral administration may provide is suggested by the remarkable
success of Benin’s new constitutional court, which is regarded as one of the most powerful in
Africa. See generally Anna Rotman, Benin’s Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model for
Guaranteeing Human Rights, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 289–90 (2004). Rotman attributes the
elected branches’ acquiescence to the fact that the court has authority under the constitution not
only to exercise the power of judicial review, but also to administer elections. Id. No politician
wants to be on the outs with the vote counter.
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321
setting of lawmakers’ salaries. Lawmakers hoping to detoxify what
voters would otherwise take to be a self-serving reform (such as a pay
raise) probably would do better to delegate the decision to a wellregarded and constitutionally ensconced independent body than to an
ad hoc entity of the lawmakers’ own making.322
To be sure, a constitutional structure that authorizes the
delegation of statutory responsibilities to the advisory counterpart
may have costs as well as benefits for the body’s independence.
Lawmakers empowered to delegate might try to divert the advisory
body from its constitutionally mandated responsibilities by weighing
it down with make-work. Or perhaps the possibility of augmenting an
advisory body’s powers through delegation would increase the
incentives for lawmakers to try to capture the advisory counterpart
and redirect it for partisan purposes. With an eye to judicial
independence, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to
substantially restrict congressional delegations of non-judicial
323
functions to the federal courts. Perhaps it would be best for
legislatures to be similarly precluded from delegating non-advisory
responsibilities to constitution-chartered counterparts. I raise the
possibility of non-advisory delegations only to point out that, in the
324
case of advisory counterparts, these risks might be worth incurring.

321. Roger H. Davidson, The Politics of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Compensation,
in THE REWARDS OF PUBLIC SERVICE 53, 76–87 (Robert W. Hartman & Arnold Weber eds.,
1980) (discussing congressional efforts to establish “objective, automatic decisionmaking
process,” led by appointed commission, to set lawmakers’ salaries).
322. Congress’s efforts to lodge responsibility for lawmakers’ pay in obscure commissions
have not succeeded in quelling voter outrage over pay increases. See David W. Brady & Sean
M. Theriault, A Reassessment of Who’s to Blame: A Positive Case for the Public Evaluation of
Congress, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 175, 178–80 (John
R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) (sketching the history of congressional
strategies to raise lawmakers’ pay).
323. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677–78 (1988) (“As a general rule, we have broadly
stated that executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on
judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution. The purpose of this limitation is to help
ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch and to prevent the Judiciary from encroaching
into areas reserved for the other branches.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
324. It might be possible to achieve some of the benefits of legislative delegation without the
independence costs by stipulating in the constitution that additional, non-advisory tasks may be
delegated to the advisory counterpart but only if consented to by that body.
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III. COURTS AND COUNTERPARTS TOGETHER: CONFLICT
OR COMPLEMENTARITY?
In comparing constitutional courts and advisory counterparts in
terms of remedy design, public opinion, and independence, I have
treated courts and counterparts as if they were institutional
alternatives for giving effect to basic liberal aspirations.
Constitutional judicial review is, however, a firmly established
practice in most democracies today. When institutional reform
opportunities do arise, the available choice is less likely to be “court
or counterpart” than “court and counterpart, or court alone.” It is
worth asking what problems or synergies might arise from courts and
counterparts working side by side. I see two plausible bases for
concern, which I shall briefly address in this Part (recognizing that the
topic deserves much closer attention than I have space to give it
here).
To begin, one might worry that courts and counterparts will
collaborate to create more interventionist bodies of constitutional law
than the court alone would otherwise have created. The judiciary’s
willingness to use its remedial powers to pursue large-scale policy
reforms is plausibly constrained, in part, by judges’ sense of the
limitations of their case-specific point of view, their meager factfinding abilities, and the difficulties they would face in monitoring
policy implementation.325 These factors together create a likelihood
that judge-made policies would miss the mark. If the court could lift a
remedial scheme, as it were, out of the policy recommendations of an
advisory counterpart, and if the court could further rely on the
advisory body to monitor or even administer the policy’s
implementation, the court might become more aggressive.326
325. Cf. Grimm, supra note 128, at 116–18 (arguing that courts’ informational limitations
and the sequencing of legislative and judicial decision soften the “democratic risks” associated
with constitutional judicial review).
326. Cf. Kirby, supra note 79, at 439 (“In 20 years as an appellate judge, I have noticed a
distinct change of attitude among the Australian judiciary concerning the citation and use of law
reform reports. Whereas two decades ago this was comparatively rare and treated with
suspicion or even hostility, today that attitude has virtually disappeared. Partly, this is . . . [due
to the fact that] law reform agencies have the time and purpose to identify the issues of principle
and policy that are otherwise neglected in . . . the submissions that courts typically receive from
the Bar table.”); id. at 440 (speculating that law commission report concerning aboriginal
customary land rights, and the attendant “national discussion of the operation of Australian law
upon the indigenous people of the nation,” “resulted in attitudinal changes in the legal
profession and judiciary,” culminating in a High Court decision which, reversing a century of
land law, determined that the acquisition of sovereignty over the continent by the British Crown
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By way of illustration, consider how the Indian Supreme Court
has made use of the National Human Rights Commission. In a case in
which the plaintiffs alleged “flagrant violations of human rights on a
mass scale,” the Court delegated to the Commission the task of
327
Though the
investigating abuses and ordering compensation.
Commission was time-barred by its authorizing legislation from
investigating the alleged killings, the Court held that insofar as the
Commission was acting on the Court’s behalf, the Commission was
sui generis and had “a free hand . . . not circumscribed by any
328
[statutory] conditions.” In this capacity, moreover, the Commission
could issue orders binding on the government, notwithstanding the
lack of any statutory or constitutional authorization for the
329
Commission to play a more-than-advisory role. As the Commission
proposed, and the Court held, “[t]he shackles and limitations of the
[Commission’s organic act] are not attached to this body [when] it . . .
function[s] under the remit of the Supreme Court.”330
On the other hand, it may be doubted that the presence of the
Commission made the Court more aggressive than it otherwise would
331
have been. A famously activist body, the Indian Supreme Court has
did not fully extinguish aboriginal title); Sir Anthony Mason, Law Reform and the Courts, in
THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 314, 325 (“[A]s a judge and as a lawyer, I
have derived very considerable assistance from reports and issues papers published by law
reform commissions . . . . To the extent that community standards, values and policy
considerations are relevant, the reports of the law reform commissions . . . provide a source of
material that the courts otherwise lack.”); Michael Sayers, Cooperation Across Frontiers, in THE
PROMISE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 79, at 243, 252 (“Law reform agency reports . . . have a
significant effect in changing views and in providing guidance to the courts . . . . This can lead to
a gradual change in the law by developments through the courts. In a recent two-year period,
over 40 reported English cases referred to the work of the Law Commission for England and
Wales.”).
327. CRL. M.P. No. 4808 of 1998 in Writ Petitions (Criminal) Nos. 447 & 497 of 1995
(Oaramjit Kaur v. State of Punjab), at 2 (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
328. Id. at 3–6.
329. Id. at 3, 6.
330. Id. at 4, 6.
331. See generally Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limits of
the World’s Most Active Judiciary, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 77
(Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992) (explaining the practice of “social action
litigation” fostered by the Indian Supreme Court); S.P. Sathe, India: From Positivism to
Structuralism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS 215, 258 (Jeffrey Goldsworth ed., 2006)
(describing Indian Supreme Court’s use of “direction” remedies in cases challenging legislative
and executive inaction); Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and
Fundamental Rights in India: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950–2000), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
413, 439–59 (1998) (chronicling fundamental rights jurisprudence of Indian Supreme Court since
1970s).
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on other occasions “appointed . . . social activists, teachers, scholars,
journalists, bureaucrats, and judicial officers, to act as
332
‘commissioners’ and assist in . . . gathering evidence.” The Court has
also solicited remedy recommendations from ad hoc, Court333
appointed commissions.
The extent to which informational and administrative limitations
curtail judicial activism is uncertain. Judicial restraint or its absence
may depend much more on powers of retaliation that inhere in the
334
elected branches, and on normative understandings about the
judicial function that develop organically.335 In the abstract, then, it’s
hard to say whether the prospect of court-counterpart collaboration
resulting in an emboldened court should be viewed as problematic.
The answer may vary with the details of different constitutional
orders and traditions. Indeed, one cannot rule out a priori the
counterhypothesis that establishing a substantially independent
advisory counterpart will result in less aggressive judicial review.
Perhaps the chartering of a counterpart would cause some justices to
adopt less expansive understandings of their representationreinforcement responsibilities, for example, figuring that there is now
a complementary institution positioned to play that role in other
more democratic ways.
There is a second basis for objecting to court-counterpart
collaboration: the prospect of victory through the courts could dilute
the counterpart’s incentive to develop effective practices for engaging
popular opinion.336 The Indian experience suggests that in countries
with strong constitutional courts, advisory counterparts will
undertake their work with an eye to judicial review. In challenging
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA),
the National Human Rights Commission “pursued a threefold
strategy,” which consisted of (1) “monitor[ing] closely the manner in

332. Sripati, supra note 331, at 456; see also Baar, supra note 331, at 80 (describing the use of
monitoring agencies by the Indian Supreme Court).
333. Sripati, supra note 331, at 456 (mentioning the case of Tarun Bhgat Sangh, Alwar v.
Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 293, in which the Supreme Court sought from the commission
“appropriate recommendations for addressing potential threats to the environment”).
334. See generally Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 294.
335. Cf. KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 20–71 (1999) (explaining that the Samuel Chase impeachment
served to “construct” an understanding, shared by judges and members of the elected branches,
about both the limits of the judicial role and permissible grounds for impeachment).
336. Thanks to David Fontana for raising this issue in commenting on an early draft.

01__ELMENDORF.DOC

1040

3/9/2007 7:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:953

which the Act was being implemented”; (2) “prepar[ing] a dossier
[for] possible recourse to the Supreme Court”; and, as the date
neared for the legislature to extend the Act (3) “prepar[ing] a direct
337
approach to all Members of Parliament seeking an end to this law.”
But the opportunities presented by an activist and sympathetic
constitutional court haven’t led the Commission to forsake broadly
stated appeals to political morality and national self-understanding.
The public letter that the Commission circulated when TADA came
up for renewal focused on the Act’s “draconian . . . effect and
character . . . .”338 The letter portrayed TADA as inconsistent with
basic ideals embedded in India’s constitution and long-standing
statutes, and honored throughout history by “civilized beings and
339
civilized nations . . . .” Likewise, the Commission’s formal opinion
against the proposed Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2000, undertook to
analyze the bill “not strictly from the point of view of constitutional
validity . . . which, if necessary, would be a matter for the courts to
decide, but on the need and wisdom of enacting such a law
particularly in the light of the earlier experiences with TADA . . . .”340
The gist of the Commission’s opinion was that India’s liberal
traditions, her obligations under international covenants, and the
security of her people, would all be better served if terrorism were
battled through institutional reforms to the police, public prosecutors,
and the courts, and by passing new laws targeting terrorist finances,
rather than by doing what the bill proposed to do—to wit, creating
presumptions of guilt, allowing confessions before police officers to
be admissible in evidence, and extending the period for which
terrorist suspects could be held uncharged and without bail.
In short, what Mark Tushnet calls “judicial overhang”341 may
cause advisory counterparts to peg some of their findings to judgemade doctrine, and perhaps even to defer to judges on the ultimate
question of what the constitution requires or prohibits, but overhang
seems unlikely to lead the counterparts to abandon other promising
strategies for influencing the course of events. If the goal is to foster
337. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1994–1995, supra note 163, para.
4.5.
338. Id. annexure I.
339. Id.
340. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 166, para. 3.0.
341. Tushnet uses the phrase “judicial overhang” to refer to the impact of anticipated
judicial review on legislators’ constitutional deliberations and their crafting of statutes. See
TUSHNET, supra note 157, at 57–65.
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popular engagement with questions about foundational ideals, then
the answer, from an institutional design perspective, is to give the
342
counterparts tools and resources that facilitate such engagement.
Perhaps Tushnet is correct that this goal also counts in favor of
abolishing constitutional judicial review. But however aggressive the
constitutional court, it seems doubtful that adding an advisory
counterpart to the institutional mix would, on balance, debilitate
popular engagement with questions about the polity’s basic
commitments and how well they are being served.
It should be noted, finally, that constitutional courts and advisory
counterparts may prove to be complementary institutions in many
respects. Constitutional courts could be quite useful for policing the
separation of powers between counterparts and the elected branches,
defending the political independence of the counterparts while also
checking the counterparts’ use of potentially disruptive powers of
investigation.343 Conversely, the counterparts’ research and
recommendations, and the public’s reaction thereto, could usefully
inform constitutional court decisionmaking without leading the court
to be more aggressive overall.344

342. See supra Part II.B.2.
343. See, e.g., New Nat’l Party v. Gov’t of Republic of S. Afr., 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) at 231
(S. Afr.) (stating that Electoral Commission is entitled to “financial independence,” defined as
“funding reasonably sufficient to enable the Commission to carry out its constitutional
mandate,” and “administrative independence,” defined as “control over those matters directly
connected with the functions which the Commission has to perform under the Constitution and
the [Electoral] Act”); cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Dec. 15, 1983, 65 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGe] 1
(F.R.G.), translated in 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 94 (1984) (introducing the concept of “informational
separation of powers,” and contending that “basic [information privacy] rights protection
cannot be left purely to the discretion of the [government] administration” but rather “effective
control by data protection commissioners is required”).
344. Cf. Elmendorf, supra note 210, at 434–40 (exploring ways in which independent
electoral commissions may help constitutional courts more effectively to regulate the political
process). Also of interest in this regard is Charles Sabel and William Simon’s argument that
institutional reform litigation is most productive where (1) there are standard setting
organizations on which the courts may rely in making liability determinations; and (2)
legislatures assist the courts by setting up ongoing monitoring agencies. See Sabel & Simon,
supra note 128, at 1063–64 (regarding liability determinations); id. at 1072 (contrasting
education and public housing, where litigation has been aided by public monitoring agencies,
with police conduct and prisons, as to which “sophisticated monitoring systems” do not yet
exist); id. at 1051–52 (regarding exclusionary zoning litigation and the legislative establishment
of monitoring agencies). Advisory counterparts might usefully contribute to the
“experimentalist” mode of public law litigation championed by Sabel, Simon, and others by
recommending standards, by undertaking monitoring, and perhaps even by rallying public
attention to the issues at hand. Cf. id. at 1072–73 (discussing difficulties with judicial formulation
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Finally, the existence of a court with de jure authority to enjoin
the implementation of unconstitutional statutes may help to sustain
the convention that the counterpart’s recommendations really are just
advisory. Were there no constitutional court to stand in as the
ultimate backstop against the abuse of state power, a convention
might emerge under which certain kinds of counterpart
“recommendations” are understood to bind the elected branches. A
widespread popular fear of untrammeled state power, plus a few
historically salient occasions on which the counterpart successfully
challenged such abuses, might be enough to bring such a convention
into being.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, constitutional theorists have begun to question
the longstanding premise that constitutional courts occupy a
privileged epistemic position with respect to the meaning of
constitutional texts.345 Calls for dialogue between the court and the
citizenry, or the court and the elected branches of government, are
346
increasingly widespread. Yet very little attention has been paid to
the question of what kinds of non-judicial institutions might be—or
are being—employed to elaborate or enforce the basic commitments
of liberal democracies.347 This Article has started to explore one such
class of institutions. Advisory commissions are familiar to Americans
mostly in their ad hoc, crisis-response incarnation, but ongoing

of sanctions and concluding that the experimentalist model for public law litigation ultimately
“pins its hopes largely on the effects of transparency . . . exposing poor performance as clearly as
possible [and thereby] open[ing] the system to general scrutiny”).
345. Among the recent and noteworthy works exploring non-judicial constitutional
interpretation are: SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (1991);
NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); TUSHNET, supra note 157; JEREMY WALDRON,
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); WHITTINGTON, supra note 335.
346. See generally Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative
Potential of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2006) (surveying
theories of dialogic constitutionalism in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand).
347. Cf. Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True
Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897 (2005) (surveying political science literature
and raising doubts about the practicality of popular engagement with questions of constitutional
meaning); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands,
103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 676 (2005) (“[T]he new theoretical scholarship [on extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation] has largely overlooked questions of how the political branches
effectuate the Constitution, or how they might do a better job of it.”).
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investigatory and advice-giving bodies with jurisdiction over
foundational commitments of liberal democracy are becoming
fixtures of many constitutional democracies.
I have advanced a preliminary account of what the advisory
counterparts might offer by way of sustenance to liberal democracy.
Instrumentally, the counterparts are or could be, in key respects,
better positioned than constitutional courts to put in place structural
safeguards against illiberality. This follows from their capacity to craft
“legislative” remedies; from their resources for scrutinizing the
government and engaging public opinion; and from the normative
possibility of greater independence from the elected branches of
government. To be sure, the circumstances under which a purely
advisory body can build a base of public support sufficient to
transform the political calculus of elected officials vis-à-vis the
counterpart’s preferred reforms are probably quite narrow. But there
is anecdotal evidence that, in the wake of scandals and on election
law and government integrity questions, elected officials’ flouting of
counterpart recommendations sometimes elicits public backlash.
Advisory counterparts may also perform a dialogic function,
prompting, maintaining, and focusing public discourse about the
import of nominally constitutive ideals for contemporary problems.
Counterparts may foment debate by conducting educational
campaigns, by carrying out high-profile investigations, or by
exercising legislative process rights. Counterparts whose jurisdiction
covers the gamut of the polity’s constitutional aspirations would seem
particularly well-suited to play a debate-forcing role; such bodies may
be able to exercise significant persuasive authority with the electorate
regarding constitutional priorities even if they are not ultimately
persuasive concerning what should be done about the problem at
hand.
As dialogic institutions, the counterparts have a number of
plausibly attractive properties when compared to constitutional
courts. For one, the reform proposals that counterparts offer up for
discussion are more likely than judicial opinions to be intelligible to
the general public, and more likely to emerge from an open,
participatory process. This follows from the counterparts’ dependence
on persuasive rather than legal authority. As well, the constitutional
context in which the counterpart makes its proposal is more likely to
sustain a public discourse that focuses on the substance of the
constitutional obligation in question (rather than judicial roles), and
which is conducive to learning, compromise, and mutual respect.
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My account of what the counterparts have to offer is fueled by a
fair amount of conjecture. It is meant to provoke further inquiry, not
to settle anything. Looking ahead, I see three avenues for future
research. First, there is a pressing need for careful empirical work,
both quantitative and qualitative, on the extant counterparts.
Empirical studies could help to illuminate the nature of counterpart
effects on public opinion; the methods by which counterparts seek to
credential their recommendations; the modalities of counterpart
influence on the decisionmaking of constitutional courts;348 the impact
of activist constitutional courts on counterparts’ choice of strategy;
the sources of political support for counterpart independence; and
more. Basic questions I have bracketed in this paper remain to be
explored, including the ways in which counterparts might bring about
the enactment of proposed reforms without appealing to domestic
public opinion.349 Another path for future research—this one
normative in nature—is to more clearly define the basis for thinking
that some sort of public engagement with questions of constitutional
policy is a good thing, and on this basis to offer a more refined
comparison of courts and counterparts, and better prescriptions for
counterpart design. The present Article has given an account of how
courts and counterparts may differ as dialogic institutions, but my
normative premises remain underdeveloped. Nor have I traveled very
far down the path of institutional possibility: there is a wide range of
possible de jure relationships among courts, counterparts, and
legislatures that remain to be explored and evaluated.350

348. It would be useful to understand the conditions under which counterparts either
embolden the courts, make the courts more forgiving of the democratic process, or simply
encourage the courts to pursue different regulatory strategies.
349. For example, by appealing to international opinion and thereby putting the homecountry government’s foreign policy objectives at risk; or by using administrative or
investigative powers to pressure government leaders or recalcitrant bureaucracies.
350. To give but one example: might there be something to be said for constitutional orders
in which the constitution contains three kinds of provisions: the justiciable, the nonjusticiable,
and the justiciable but not judicially remediable? Perhaps the constitutional court would have
authority (upon concluding that a provision in the third category had been violated) to
authorize the counterpart to trigger a special legislative procedure through which counterpartproposed remedies could be adopted. Call this a variation on the political question doctrine.
Although it would be utterly foreign to present-day constitutional practice in the United States,
there is already a near precedent in the United Kingdom. Under the U.K. Human Rights Act, a
judicial determination of “incompatibility” between the challenged law and the Human Rights
Act does nothing to alter the legal effect of that law, yet it does authorize the relevant
government minister to introduce (in her discretion) remedial legislation which proceeds on a
fast track. See Fontana, supra note 266.
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The third avenue for future research is country-specific
institutional tinkering: What opportunities exist for creating new
counterparts, or improving existing ones? Within the United States
there already exists a range of public advisory bodies, with varying
degrees of political insulation, whose missions (again to varying
degrees) touch on basic constitutional ideals. Examples include the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the Election
Assistance Commission, the Inspectors General, the Government
Accountability Office, and sundry state-level law reform
commissions, information commissions, privacy commissions,
electoral or redistricting commissions, and sentencing commissions.
There is a lot to ask about how these bodies might be enhanced.
In light of the global spread of investigatory and advice-giving
bodies concerned with the basic aspirations of liberal democracy, the
anecdotal successes of some of these bodies, and the limitations of
constitutional courts as participants in public discourse and as sources
of statutory and administrative reforms, the advisory-counterpart
model for giving effect to liberal ideals merits new attention from
scholars of constitutionalism.

